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REMEDIES AS PROPERTY: A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE
ON SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE CLAUSES
DAvID FRIsCH*
[A] right is best measured by effects in life.
Absence of remedy is absence of right.
Defect of remedy is defect of right.1
I. INTRODUCTION
In an article published in 1987,2 I argued that buyer status
attaches under the Uniform Commercial Code' "at the moment
the purchaser obtains the remedial right to the goods vis-A-vis,
the seller."4 The argument took the following form.
The commercial doctrine of good faith purchase makes it pos-
sible for certain transferees of goods to receive under appropri-
ate circumstances a property interest superior to that of the
transferor.5 One such protected transferee is the buyer in ordi-
nary course of business. Although the question of when during
* Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law. J.D., University of Mi-
ami; LL.M., Yale Law School. American Bar Association advisor to the U.C.C. Article
2 (Sales) Drafting Committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws. The views expressed herein are my own.
I would like to thank my colleagues, Martin A. Kotler and Robert J. Lipkin, for
their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. I also wish to acknowl-
edge with thanks the summer research grant so generously provided by Widener
University School of Law.
1. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 83-84
(1960).
2. David Frisch, Buyer Status Under the U.C.C.: A Suggested Temporal Defini-
tion, 72 IOWA L. REV. 531 (1987).
3. Unless otherwise indicated, all references and citations to "the Code" or
"U.C.C." in this Article are to the text and comments of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE (1990).
4. Frisch, supra note 2, at 533.
5. Although the scope of this discussion is limited to transactions in goods, the
good faith purchase doctrine is not. The primary point of the doctrine is to facilitate
exchange between parties in a free and open market. By generally favoring "security
of purchase" over "security of ownership," the good faith purchase doctrine stands in
sharp contrast to the first principle of Anglo-American property law, which often
appears as the Latin maxim nemo dat quod non habet (one cannot give what one
does not have). See generally Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith
Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057 (1954).
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the life of a sales transaction a purchaser qualifies as a protect-
ed buyer can manifest itself when any one of several Code sec-
tions is applicable, the context in which most courts have been
called upon to decide this question has been in the application of
U.C.C. section 9-307(1).6
Section 9-307(1) is one of the Code's numerous exceptions to
the presumptive effectiveness of a security interest.' This sec-
tion provides: "A buyer in ordinary course of business.., takes
free of a security interest created by his seller even though the
security interest is perfected and even though the buyer knows
of its existence."' When section 9-307(1) applies, the security
interest ceases to exist.
There are several possible explanations for this section. One
possible explanation is that it merely expresses a power of sale
which was intended, but not expressly authorized, by the se-
cured party.9 However, the security interest is cut off even
though the security agreement actually restricts the power of
sale, suggesting a somewhat different explanation for the sec-
tion. The power of sale is imputed not because of what the se-
cured party actually intended; but rather, because the buyer
reasonably might have assumed that was what the secured
party actually intended. This subtle shift in focus makes the
buyer's expectations paramount.
Given the assumption that section 9-307(1) is designed to
effectuate the legitimate expectations of the buyer, it is reason-
6. A determination of buyer status is also frequently required under U.C.C. § 2-
403(2). The section provides: "Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant
who deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the
entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business." U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (1990). Be-
cause the term "buyer in ordinary course" is defined in Article 1 of the U.C.C., see
id. § 1-201(9), it would seem that the drafters intended -a uniform construction of
the term irrespective of the particular setting involved.
7. Section 9-201 provides in part: "Except as otherwise provided by this Act a
security agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties, against
purchasers of the collateral and against creditors." Id. § 9-201. Therefore, in the
absence .of some exception, a secured creditor prevails against all other parties. The
Code contains a host of such exceptions scattered throughout Part 3 of Article 9.
See, eg., id. §§ 9-307 to 9-310, 9-312 to 9-315.
8. Id. § 9-307(1).
9. See 1 STATE OF N.Y. LAW REVISION COMMN REPORT, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 241 (reprint ed. 1980) (1955) [hereinafter N.Y. COMM'N REPORT].
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able to ask what are the buyer's other expectations as the trans-
action of sale progresses from contract formation to performance.
Though expectations take many forms, they should always corre-
spond to the seller's contractual obligations and the particular
enforcement mechanism available if they are breached. Of most
relevance is the seller's basic obligation to tender conforming
goods when and where the contract requires.'0 If the seller does
not deliver the goods, the buyer will find that "its substantial
equivalent for all practical purposes is readily obtainable from
others than the [seller] in exchange for a money payment."" In
light of this, the buyer's expectations likely are to be satisfied by
an enforcement mechanism that limits the buyer's relief to mon-
ey damages. 2 Where, however, the "subject matter of [a] con-
tract is unique in character and cannot be duplicated" or the
purchase of "a substantial equivalent involves difficulty, delay,
and inconvenience,"" the seller may have to actually per-
form.'4
Viewed in this way, one sees a close functional relationship
between the good faith purchase doctrine and the Code's remedi-
al rules. Because the seller usually has the option to deliver or
pay damages, the point has not been reached where the buyer
has a title expectation needing protection. Put another way, if
the buyer cannot compel the seller's performance, the state of
10. See U.C.C. § 2-301 (1990) ("The obligation of the seller is to transfer and
deliver ... in accordance with the contract.").
11. 5 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1142, at 123 (1964). A central assumption
of Article 2 is that most goods have substitutes.
12. The buyer's expectation interest is vindicated fully by a damages award based
on an imagined purchase, see U.C.C. § 2-713 (1990) (measuring the buyer's damages
by the difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of
the breach and the contract price), or on an actual substitute purchase, see id. § 2-
712 (permitting the buyer to "cover" by buying elsewhere and to recover from the
seller the difference between the cover price and the contract price).
13. 5 CORBIN, supra note 11, § 1142, at 117-18.
14. According to § 2-716(1), specific performance is available "where the goods are
unique or in other proper circumstances." U.C.C. § 2-716(1) (1990). Similarly, § 2-
716(3) provides for replevin when goods are "identified to the contract if after rea-
sonable effort [the buyer] is unable to effect cover for such goods or the circumstanc-
es reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing.. . ." Id. § 2-716(3). The
buyer may also have a right to the goods when, because of the seller's insolvency, a
monetary claim would be less valuable or worse, valueless. See id. § 2-502. For more
on these Article 2 sections, see infra part III.B.3.
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the seller's title is immaterial. The buyer's title concerns
crystallize, however, once the buyer acquires the legally cogniza-
ble right to obtain possession of the goods. It is then, and only
then, that the buyer's legitimate claim to good faith purchaser
status materializes.
My point, that the rights of the buyer should turn on the
existence of a proprietary power over the goods, ultimately does
not turn on the good faith purchase doctrine. It is equally appli-
cable whenever a rule of law secures the buyer's purchase. For
example, U.C.C. section 9-306(2) provides that a disposition of
collateral pursuant to the secured party's authorization termi-
nates the security interest."s One obvious issue is the meaning
of the term "disposition." A disposition includes, as the subsec-
tion tells us, a "sale" or "exchange," but the term should also be
read to include the moment at which a buyer becomes entitled to
possessory relief.6
In this Article, I would like to place the relationship between
remedies and protected property interests that I previously have
advocated in a broader theoretical perspective. Although much
has been written about the nature of property, 7 this more basic
relationship largely has been ignored." Part II of this Article
argues that, in general, the most useful criterion for determining
whether an interest in specific property ("property right") exists
is the characteristics of the remedies available for certain depri-
vations. I maintain that central to the idea of property rights is
15. Section 9-306(2) states in relevant part:
(2) Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest con-
tinues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition
thereof unless the disposition was authorized by the secured party in the
security agreement or otherwise ....
U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1990).
16. Unfortunately, not all courts would agree. See, e.g., Weisbart & Co. v. First
Nat'l Bank, 568 F.2d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 1978) (failing to give the word "disposition"
any meaning independent of sale or exchange); Mechanics Nat'l Bank v. Gaucher,
386 N.E.2d 1052, 1055-57 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (refusing to allow "disposition" with-
out a completed sale or right to payment).
17. For a relatively recent expanded analysis of this matter, see STEVEN R.
MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY (1990).
18. Professor Jay Lawrence Westbrook is one theorist who has acknowledged the
relationship between remedies and property. See Jay L. Westbrook, A Functional
Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 227, 257-63 (1989).
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the legal entitlement to remedies that permits a person to exer-
cise dominion over the specific asset or to exclude the exercise of
dominion by others.
Part HI examines the life history of a contract for the sale of
goods. This Part demonstrates that the buyer ordinarily will not
acquire a property interest in goods until the seller has complet-
ed performance. In Part IV of the Article, I respond to the deci-
sion made by the U.C.C. Article 2 (Sales) Drafting Committee of
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (the "Drafting Committee") that specific performance
should be available to the buyer if the parties have expressly
agreed.19 My analysis suggests that the effect of such a statuto-
ry provision would be to tolerate misleading appearances of the
seller's ownership upon which creditors and purchasers may
rely. I deal with the implications of my analysis both inside and
outside the seller's bankruptcy.
II. TOWARDS A THEORY OF REMEDIES AS PROPERTY
My explanation for why certain remedies should be seen as
defining property interests cannot completely be understood
apart from the claim that what we call "property" is but an
aggregate of different sorts of legal relations.0 Because I be-
19. Interestingly, the Drafting Committee rejected the idea of providing that spe-
cific performance provisions should also be enforceable when they operate in favor of
the seller. The seller's right to specific performance will therefore depend on equita-
ble principles that co-exist with the Code under § 1-103. This decision followed from
two concerns. One was that a high proportion of these provisions would find their
way into the boilerplate of non-negotiated consumer contracts. The other concern
follows from the fact that the only difference between specific performance for the
seller and an action for the contract price (damages), see U.C.C. § 2-709 (1990), is
that enforcement of the former is by contempt. For some members of the Committee
this conjured up unacceptable visions of a debtor's prison.
20. See Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 361
(1954) (EIssentially this institution of private property that we are trying to identi-
fy in outline is not a collection of physical objects, but rather a set of relation-
ships . . . ."). Stephen Munzer refers to this notion of property as the "sophisticated
conception":
The other way of understanding property is the sophisticated conception.
One might almost call it the legal conception, for 20.1220 it is very com-
mon among lawyers. It understands property as relations. More precisely,
property consists in certain relations, usually legal relations, among per-
1994] 1695
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lieve that this relational concept of property can best be seen if
one approaches the matter from the theoretical perspective of
Wesley N. Hohfeld, I will begin by briefly describing his so-
called fundamental legal conceptions. Next, I will use Hohfeld's
vocabulary to describe what distinguishes property relations
from other legal relations. Only then will I present my own view
that possessory remedies involve the same sorts of relations
among persons and with respect to things as do other more
traditional property rights. Finally, I will look at the perfor-
mance of a sales contract and, in doing so, demonstrate that no
property interest vests in the buyer until an effective possessory
remedy is acquired.
A. The Indeterminacy of Legal Concepts and Hohfeld's
Fundamental Legal Conceptions
In 1913, Hohfeld published the first of a series of influential
articles in which he claimed to have identified what he described
as the eight 'lowest common denominators of the law."2 These
sons or other entities with respect to things. A metaphorical way of stat-
ing the sophisticated conception is that property is a bundle of "sticks."
MUNZER, supra note 17, at 16. Bear in mind that because our concern is with legal
property interests (these may or may not correspond to natural, political or moral
property interests), the only relations that matter are those recognized by the legal
system. See the discussion of Hohfeld's work, infra notes 21-36.
21. Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judi-
cial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 58 (1913) [hereinafter Hohfeld, Some Fundamental
Legal Conceptions]. Hohfeld's other writings include Wesley N. Hohfeld, Faulty Anal-
ysis in Easement and License Cases, 27 YALE L.J. 66 (1917); Wesley N. Hohfeld,
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710
(1917) [hereinafter Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions]. Over the years,
Hohfeld's selection of eight terms has not gone unchallenged. See, e.g., Albert
Kocourek, Tabulae Minores Jurisprudentiae, 30 YALE L.J. 215 (1921) (arguing that
the correct number of terms is greater than eight); William H. Page, Terminology
and Classification in Fundamental Jural Relations, 4 AM. L. SCH. REV. 616 (1921)
(arguing that the correct number of terms cannot be ascertained); Roscoe Pound,
Legal Rights, 26 INT'L J. ETHIcS 92 (1915) (arguing that the correct number of
terms is less than eight). For other worthwhile discussions of Hohfeld, see generally
Arthur L. Corbin, Jural Relations and Their Classification, 30 YALE L.J. 226 (1921);
E. Adamson Hoebel, Fundamental Legal Concepts as Applied in the Study of Primi-
tive Law, 51 YALE L.J. 951 (1942); Isaac Husik, Hohfeld's Jurisprudence, 72 U. PA.
L. REV. 263 (1924); Max Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 HARv. L. REv. 1141
(1938); Roy L. Stone, An Analysis of Hohfeld, 48 MINN. L. REV. 313 (1963).
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consist of four primary entitlements (rights, privileges, powers,
and immunities) and their opposites and correlatives (no-rights,
duties, disabilities, and liabilities).22 His purpose was to demon-
strate that only by utilizing these fundamental conceptions was
it possible to "think straight" about everyday legal problems.'
In this connection, he exposed abstract legal ideas like "title,"
"due process," "privity," and "ownership" as meaningless expres-
sions and, hence, unsuitable guides to the understanding and
correct solution of cases.24
The natural starting point in understanding Hohfeld's scheme
is to grasp the significance of the manner in which he exhibited
22. See Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 21, at 30.
23. Id. at 18.
24. See EDWIN W. PATrERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 139
(1953). As one commentator explains:
[I]t was Hohfeld's thought that any legal term can be analyzed in terms
of his fundamental legal relations, for they comprise a precise system for
describing legal effects at all levels of remoteness. "Title," for example, is
not a thing. If the term has any meaning at all, the meaning lies in the
legal effects of "having title," that is, in the complex of rights, powers,
privileges, immunities, etc., that the law gives to a person who has title
to something. The insight that Hohfeld's analytical system provides has
already been immensely valuable for understanding legal concepts.
Alan D. Cullison, A Review of Hohfeld's Fundamental Legal Concepts, 16 CLEV.-MAR.
L. REV. 559, 573 (1967). This nominalist conception of the law was not new. As
early as 1782, Jeremy Bentham made a similar argument:
Power, right, prohibition, duty, obligation, burthen, immunity, exemption,
privilege, property, security, liberty-all these with a multitude of others
that might be named are so many fictitious entities which the law upon
one occasion or another is considered in common speech as creating or
disposing of. Not an operation does it ever perform, but it is considered
as creating or in some manner or other disposing of these its imaginary
productions.
JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL 251 (H.LA Hart ed., 1970) (1782).
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his eight terms to the reader. They were diagrammatically
paired in the following manner:'
JURAL OPPOSITES
rights privilege power immunity
no-rights duty disability liability
JURAL CORRELATIVES
right privilege power immunity
duty no-right liability disability
Implicit in the depiction of these terms is the crucial point
that Hohfeld perceived the positive legal world26 as a dynamic,
multiple two-party system in which legal rights-in the broadest
sense2--were defined functionally as sets of jural relations. For
example, as I explain below, jural correlatives are no more than
a systematic expression of relations. Hohfeld makes it quite
clear that each primary entitlement and its correlative are ex-
pressions of the same fundamental legal relation, as looked at
25. See Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 21, at 30.
26. It is worth noting that Hohfeld is concerned only with rules of positive law. In
fact, one of his preliminary points is that the general failure to distinguish the legal
from the non-legal is the root cause of much that is wrong with legal analysis. See
id. at 20 ("[T]he arguments that one may hear in court almost any day and likewise
a considerable number of judicial opinions afford ample evidence of the inveterate
and unfortunate tendency to confuse and blend the legal and the non-legal quantities
in a given problem.").
27. By the "broadest sense," I mean to include within the scope of the word
"right" the additional conceptions of privilege, power, and immunity. As Stephen
Munzer explains:
[To do otherwise] ignores, or underemphasizes, a unifying feature of the
[right, privilege, power, and immunity] conceptions .... They are all
rights in the broad sense of being individual advantages secured by
law-where advantages include both choices and benefits. It is just that
the advantage is sometimes secured by something other than a correla-
tive duty on another person.
MUNZER, supra note 17, at 20 (footnote omitted). As noted in the text accompanying
notes 29-31, when Hohfeld uses the term "right," he uses it in the more limited
sense of the right-duty relation.
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from the different perspective of the two parties to the relation.
The system is dynamic in that the relations between any two
people can change over time. This is evident in Hohfeld's de-
scription of an operative fact. According to Hohfeld, "Operative,
constitutive, causal, or 'dispositive' facts are those which, under
the general legal rules that are applicable, suffice to change
legal relations, that is, either to create a new relation, or to
extinguish an old one, or to perform both of these functions
simultaneously."' No brief summary can do justice to Hohfeld's
work, but it is possible to set out the basic elements of his theo-
ry if we consider separately the concepts of "rights" and "pow-
ers."
1. Rights
Hohfeld begins his discussion of the nature of rights by assail-
ing what he saw as the prevailing "looseness of usage."29 Ac-
cording to Hohfeld, the clue to the only true meaning of the term
"right" is found in its correlative, "duty." "[I1f X has a right
against Y that he shall stay off the former's land, the correlative
(and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off
the place.""0 This formulation reveals that Hohfeld has in mind
a relation between two specific individuals, one who is the right-
holder, and one who is the duty-bearer. Whether we speak of
rights or duties we are speaking of the same fundamental legal
relation; only our perspective changes. The statement that X has
a right against Y means that if Y acts or forbears from acting in
a certain manner, a court will grant a remedy to X.
What if Y were at liberty to do or not to do a given act with-
out liability to X? According to Hohfeld, the parties would then
stand in a privilege-no-right relation. The best way to think
about this relation is that it is the antithesis of the right-duty
relation. Note that the term "no-right" is the jural opposite of
right, and the term "privilege" is the jural opposite of duty. To
use Hohfeld's example, "whereas X has a right or claim that Y,
the other man, should stay off the land, he himself has the privi-
28. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 21, at 25.
29. Id. at 30.
30. Id. at 32.
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lege of entering on the land; or, in equivalent words, X does not
have a duty to stay off.""' We can also describe the relation
from the other end. To the extent that X has a privilege to enter
on the land, Y has a no-right (the correlative of X's privilege)
that X shall not enter. To say that X's act was privileged means,
therefore, that a court will not grant a remedy to Y.
The above discussion demonstrates that Hohfeld's right-duty
and privilege-no-right relations are essentially formulations for
assessing a defendant's liability. What they offer is a powerful
analytical tool for conceptualizing and evaluating the legal effect
of behavior. In order for an act to be the basis of civil liability a
right-duty relation must exist between the plaintiff and the de-
fendant. Conversely, if the court finds that the parties stand in
the relation of privilege-no-right, the outcome of the case will be
a judgment for the defendant.
2. Powers
Essentially what Hohfeld means by the term "power" is that Y
(the power-holder) has the capacity to alter the legal status of X
(the liability-bearer). It is obvious from this statement that the
concept of "liability" is simply the correlative of power. The two
terms describe the same relation from both ends. The Restate-
ment of Property offers some of the clearest examples of the
essential character of the power-liability relation. Because these
examples also demonstrate the relevance of the right-duty and
privilege-no-right relations, they are worth quoting in their en-
tirety:
1. A, the owner of Blackacre, gives B a power of attorney to
transfer Blackacre to a purchaser. B has a power. A is under
a liability.
2. A is the owner of Blackacre. A authorizes B to transfer
Blackacre to a purchaser. B has a power with regard to A's
land and A is under a liability with respect to B. So far as B
acts in conformity with the terms of his instructions he has
both a power and a privilege. If he acts in violation of the




es as to bind A, he has a power but not a privilege, that is, A
has a right that B shall not transfer as he did and B is under
a duty not to transfer in that way, but if he does so transfer
to C he will extinguish A's interest in the land.
3. B has the recorded title to Blackacre. He transfers the land
to A. A does not record his deed. B makes a formally suffi-
cient conveyance of the same land to C who buys in ignorance
of the conveyance to A, and who pays full value for the land
and records his deed. B in so conveying to C exercised a pow-
er to destroy A's interest and A was under a corresponding
liability with regard to B. B has no privilege to do so and in
doing so violates A's rights.32
Last in Hohfeld's scheme is the disability-immunity relation.
For Hohfeld, the term "disability" is equivalent to the absence of
a power.3 If a power is absent in one party, a term is needed to
express the idea of absence of liability in the other party.
Hohfeld selected the term "immunity" for this purpose.34 Con-
sequently, disability is the opposite of power, and immunity is
the correlative of disability and the opposite of liability. Hohfeld
offers a few examples to make this clear:
X, a landowner, has, as we have seen, power to alienate to Y
or to any other ordinary party. On the other hand, X has also
various immunities as against Y, and all other ordinary par-
ties. For Y is under a disability (i.e., has no power) so far as
shifting the legal interest either to himself or to a third party
is concerned; and what is true of Y applies similarly to every
one else who has not by virtue of special operative facts ac-
quired a power to alienate X's property. If, indeed, a sheriff
has been duly empowered by a writ of execution to sell X's
interest, that is a very different matter: correlative to such
sheriffs power would be the liability of X,-the very opposite
of immunity (or exemption). It is elementary, too, that as
against the sheriff, X might be immune or exempt in relation
to certain parcels of property, and be liable as to others.35
32. RESTATEMNT OF PROPERTY § 3 illus. (1936).
33. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 21, at 55.
34. Id. ("Immunity is one's freedom from the legal power or 'control' of another as
regards some legal relation.").
35. Id.
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In sum, Hohfeld's power-liability and immunity-disability
relations signal a susceptibility to having one's legal position
altered by certain acts of another. If X, by the doing of some act,
can effect a change in a legal relation involving Y, this can be
conveniently expressed by saying that X has a power and Y a
correlative disability."5 If X cannot affect Y's legal position, Y
has an immunity; correlatively, X has no power.
Although much more can be said about Hohfeld's theory, my
purpose here is simply to facilitate a better understanding of the
relational nature of property interests. Let us now consider
exactly what distinguishes property relations from other legal
relations.
B. The Character of Property
If the world were inhabited by one person, Blackstone's de-
scription of property as the "sole and despotic dominion which
one man claims and exercises over the external things of the
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in
the universe" 7 might make sense. Such a statement would de-
scribe his relation to those things and his unlimited right of free
use and disposition. It makes no sense, however, to speak of this
person's property. Because property is always subject to limi-
tations and may or may not involve tangible things, it follows
that Blackstone's conception of property, in today's world at
least, is fundamentally flawed." In short, while Blackstone's
36. Specifically, the exercise of a power by X will cause at least one of the follow-
ing relational changes with Y: (1) an existing immunity-disability relation will
change to a power-liability relation; (2) an existing power-liability relation will
change to an immunity-disability relation; (3) an existing privilege-no-right relation
will change to a right-duty relation; or (4) an existing right-duty relation will change
to a privilege-no-right relation. See Cullison, supra note 24, at 570. Observe too, that
the same act by X may have an effect on her relations with persons who are un-
known and too numerous to count. For example, if X were to publicly offer a re-
ward, her relation with each person who learned of the offer would change from an
immunity-disability relation to a power-liability relation. Each would have a newly
acquired power to create a contract with X (the power of acceptance) and X would
be under a correlative liability.
37. 2 WILLIAM BLACKsToNE, COMMENTARIES *2.
38. Blackstone's conception of property has two aspects or dimensions: Property
can exist only in tangible things and all property is absolute. Clearly, neither aspect
1702
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definition may at one time have been capable of providing pre-
dictable results,39 a lasting conception of property must be more
realistically based. In contrast with Blackstone's definition, a
fundamental tenet of Hohfeld's analytical jurisprudence is that
any conception of property must assume a relational context.
Hohfeld's contribution was to shift the focus of the inquiry from
things to legal relations. As Hohfeld explained:
is credible today. The idea that property is limited to a collection of physical objects
lost whatever force it had as courts looked for ways to extend the protective umbrel-
la of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and to protect new
forms of wealth. The best strategy they found was to designate the interest involved
as property. See Dean G. Acheson, Book Review, 33 HARV. L. REV. 329, 330 (1919)
("Everything was thought of in terms of property,-reputation, privacy, domestic rela-
tions,-and as new interests called for protection, their success depended upon their
ability to take on the protective coloring of property.") (footnote omitted); see also
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Develop-
ment of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BuFF. L. REv. 325 (1980) (discussing the
extension of property protection to business goodwill, trademarks, trade secrets, and
oil and gas).
It has long been recognized that society would be unmanageable if an absolute
right of property were recognized. See MORRIs R. COHEN & FELIX S. COHEN, READ-
INGS IN JUIsPRUDENcE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 13 (1951). Joseph Singer succinctly
describes many of the present-day limitations on the use and disposition of property:
Property rules limit what owners can do with their property (building
codes, nuisance law, law of easements, covenants, servitudes, licenses,
profits, defeasible fees, law of waste, water rights, zoning, environmental
protection statutes) ... . The freedom owners have to exclude others
from their property is substantially limited by rules that require them to
allow others access to their property (public accommodation laws,
antidiscrimination laws and fair housing statutes, common carrier obliga-
tions to the public, free speech access to shopping centers or universities
under state constitutional law, public policy exception to trespass law, the
incomplete defense of necessity). Property rules limit the freedom of
owners to determine who will own property in the future (the rule
against perpetuities, rule against restraints on alienation, rule against
creation of new estates, procedures for drafting valid wills, statutory
forced shares, the public trust doctrine). Property owners do not have
complete immunity from having their property taken away from them
without their consent; many rules define circumstances under which prop-
erty may be transferred involuntarily (recording statutes, title registra-
tion, adverse possession, prescriptive easements, implied easements, mari-
tal property statutes, constructive trusts, eminent domain law).
Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 641-42
n.108 (1988).
39. See Vandevelde, supra note 38, at 329.
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Since all legal interests are "incorporeal"-consisting, as they
do, of more or less limited aggregates of abstract legal rela-
tions-such a supposed contrast as that sought to be drawn
by Blackstone can but serve to mislead the unwary. The legal
interest of the fee simple owner of land and the comparative-
ly limited interest of the owner of a "right of way" over such
land are alike so far as "incorporeality" is concerned; the true
contrast consists, of course, primarily in the fact that the fee
simple owner's aggregate of legal relations is far more exten-
sive than the aggregate of the easement owner. °
Today Hohfeld's view is probably the predominate theory of
property4 and is embodied in the Restatement of Property. No-
where defined in the Restatement is the term "property." Be-
cause "property" is used in the Restatement to "denote legal
relations between persons with respect to a thing,"42 the Re-
statement defines the more appropriate terms "right,"4" "privi-
lege," "p ower,"4" and "immunity."4' This approach attempts
to promote "[cilarity of thought and exactness of expres-
sion .. .
This raises an important question. If property is properly
thought of as a collection of legal relations between persons, how
do we distinguish between property relations and other legal
40. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 21, at 24.
41. See, e.g., Morris S. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12
(1927) ("Whatever technical definition of property we may prefer, we must recognize
that a property right is a relation not between an owner and a thing, but between
the owner and other individuals in reference to things."); Arthur L. Corbin, Taxation
of Seats on the Stock Exchange, 31 YALE L.J. 429, 429 (1922) ("Our concept of prop-
erty has shifted; incorporeal rights have become property. And finally, 'property' has
ceased to describe any res, or object of sense, at all, and has become merely a bun-
dle of legal relations-rights, powers, privileges, immunities.") (footnote omitted);
Eirik G. Furubotn & Svetozar Pejovich, Property Rights and Economic Theory: A
Survey of Recent Literature, 10 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1137, 1139 (1972) ("[Plroperty
rights do not refer to relations between men and things but, rather, to the sanc-
tioned behavioral relations among men that arise from the existence of things and
pertain to their use.").
42. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY ch. 1, at 3 (1936) (Introductory Note).
43. Id. § 1.
44. Id. § 2.
45. Id. § 3.
46. Id. § 4.
47. Id. ch. 1 (introductory note).
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relations? In an important article, Felix Cohen nicely elaborates
on the significanceof this question and, by implication, its diffi-
culty, in the following pedagogical exchange:
C. Mr. Fielden, what do you think of the American Law Insti-
tute definition of property as including any "rights, privi-
leges, powers and immunities?" Under that definition, would
immunity from racial discrimination in the exercise of the
franchise be a property right?
F. Yes, under that definition" I suppose it would.
C. And would the right to kill in self-defense be a property
right?
F. Yes, I believe so.
C. In fact, any legal relationship under the definition of the
American Law Iistitute is property, is it not?
F. Yes, I think the definition is comprehensive enough to
cover any legal relation.
C. Might such a definition of property be useful to the teach-
ers of property law who agreed on this definition in case they
want to stake out jurisdictional claims to cover any legal
problem whatsoever in their property courses?
F. Yes, I suppose it might have some utility in that direc-
tion.
C. But this definition would not be useful to us in trying to
determine whether property exists in a given factory?
F. No.
48
Thus, although the observation that property is a set of legal
relations may prove highly useful in preventing the discussion
from straying to nonlegal usages of the term, in a sense, we
have taken only the first step. A relations-based theory cannot
itself explain why certain kinds of relations are not and should
not be considered property. The concept of property cannot be
completely comprehended, therefore, without considering a more
fundamental issue; namely, what constellation of Hohfeldian
conceptions are sufficient and necessary to its existence. Recog-
48. Cohen, supra note 20, at 365 (citation omitted); see also Comment, Adverse
Possession of One's Own Debt, 29 YALE L.J. 91, 94 n.16 (1919) ("Does not property
mean anything of value to the individual? .. . This but emphasizes the point that
the term is too inclusive to be of assistance in solving most disputed points.").
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nizing the necessity of such an inquiry places us in the realm of
the "full" or "liberal" concept of ownership."
A fundamental tenent of the liberal conception of property is
that all mature legal systems have a common perception of
ownership.0 To be more concrete, if ownership is defined as
"the greatest possible interest in a thing which a mature system
of law recognizes,"5 it should be possible to identify its stan-
dard incidents. Only when we have a clear idea of the commonly
understood meaning of ownership can we expect to determine
which lesser incidents comprise more limited property rights.52
A well-known listing of the standard incidents of ownership is
provided by A.M. Honor. 53
49. I have borrowed this terminology from A.M. Honord. See A.M. Honor6, Own-
ership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (FIRST SERIES) 107 (Anthony G. Guest
ed., 1961). For Honor6, the full or liberal concept of ownership is embraced by a
legal system if it is possible for all of the 11 incidents of ownership, see infra notes
54-67 and accompanying text, to be united in one person. He is careful to point out,
however, that the presence of all 11 incidents, while together sufficient to constitute
ownership, may not be individually necessary. Honor6, supra, at 112-13.
50. Honor6, supra note 49, at 108 ("There is indeed, a substantial similarity in
the position of one who 'owns' an umbrella in England, France, Russia, China, and
any other modern country one may care to mention.").
51. Id.
52. Given that the incidents of ownership may be spread in a variety of ways
among two or more persons, one may face the baffling question of which person is
the actual owner. Honor6 himself tries, but fails to provide us with workable criteria
for making the choice. In the end, he concedes that the paradigm he presents is the
clear and easy case--"a single human being owning, in the full liberal sense, a sin-
gle material thing." Id. at 147. In fact, some have persuasively argued that "ft]he
question is meaningless." Singer, supra note 38, at 638.
When several parties share legal rights in property, any identifica-
tion of a single person as the "owner" is likely to be both arbitrary and
misleading. It is arbitrary because we could just as easily identify some-
one else as the owner. It is misleading because it denies the existence of
joint interests and the need to determine the legal relations .among all
the persons with legally protected interests in the property.
Id. Ultimately, for the limited purposes of this Article, it does not matter who the
owner is. For what is at issue is the different question of whether the interest at
stake may properly be called a property interest. Although the two questions are
obviously related, a resolution of the former will not necessarily be dispositive of the
latter.
53. Reliance on Honord's incidents of ownership to help explicate a theory of prop-
erty is not new. See, e.g., LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC
FOUNDATIONS 7-23 (1977); MUNZER, supra note 17, at 22-27.
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1. The Right to Possess
Honors defines the right to possess in terms of "exclusive
physical control of a thing."' Given that the true owner may
not always have actual physical control, it follows that the right
to possess entails two distinct aspects: (1) the right to acquire
exclusive physical control; and (2) the right to retain exclusive
physical control once it has been acquired.5 Although Honor6
couches his discussion in terms of a right only, the true nature
of the relations involved is essentially different. This "right" can
be better understood by considering it as part power and part
immunity. The owner has the power to divest others of posses-
sion and is immune from having his possession divested by oth-
ers.
56
2. The Right to Use
To prevent overlap with the next two incidents, the right to
use is narrowly defined by Honor6 to mean "personal use and
enjoyment"57 only. In Hohfeld's terms, the owner has a privi-
lege to use and a right that his privilege not be interfered
with. 5
54. HonorS, supra note 49, at 113.
55. Id. Whether this incident of ownership is achieved is not a question that can
be answered without reference to the remedies available to the owner, that is, the
right to possess is inextricably tied to remedies that enable the owner to keep or
obtain possession.
56. It is not enough that the owner is immune from the efforts of others to divest
him of possession. Such an immunity would be of limited value if it were not ulti-
mately protected by a right-duty relation with third parties. Such a relation is nec-
essary if the owner is to recover damages for attempted and real interferences with
his possession. See BECKER, supra note 53, at 21 ("If I have the right to possess a
thing, others do not merely have 'no right' that I not possess it; they have a duty
not to interfere with my possession-perhaps even to see to it that the thing is
restored to me if lost.").
57. Honor6, supra note 49, at 116.
58. It must be understood that the owner has what Hohfeld would describe as a
"right" only when we can expect the legal system to act in a predictable enough
manner to make the expectations of sanctions (remedies) against third parties justi-
fied. See supra note 26.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1691
3. The Right to Manage
The right to manage is most profitably thought of as a collec-
tion of powers.59 Simply put, the owner gets to decide how the
thing owned shall be used and by whom.
4. The Right to the Income
When Honor6 speaks of income, he means "a benefit derived
from forgoing personal use of a thing and allowing others to use
it for reward." ° I view this "right" as being the functional
equivalent of the statement that the owner of a thing is to be
treated as the owner of the income from it. In light of this, the
analysis of this incident of ownership will correspond to an anal-
ysis of ownership generally. That is, we go back to incident 1
and start again with regard to whatever constitutes the income.
5. The Right to the Capital
This incident is part power and part privilege. It is the power
to alienate the thing owned,6 and the privilege to consume,
waste, or destroy it.
6. The Right to Security
Ownership assumes-apart from bankruptcy and debt collec-
tion remedies-that the thing owned cannot be expropriated by
a nonowner without first obtaining permission to do so from the
owner.
62
59. Honor6, supra note 49, at 116 ("This right depends, legally, on a cluster of
powers, chiefly powers of licensing acts which would otherwise be unlawful and
powers of contracting ... .
60. Id. at 117.
61. Id. at 118 ("This comprises the power to alienate during life or on death, by
way of sale, mortgage, gift or other mode, to alienate a part of the thing and par-
tially to alienate it.").
62. See id. at 119-20. To find the presence of this incident, what matters, once
again, is the nature of the remedies that are generally available to the owner. See
id. at 119 ("[A] general power to expropriate subject to paying compensation would




7. The Incident of Transmissibility
The incident of transmissibility is the term Honor6 uses to
describe an owner's power to devise by will the thing owned."3
8. The Incident of Absence of Term
This incident neatly captures the idea that the owner's inter-
est is indeterminate. That is, the duration of the interest is not
correlated to the happening of a stated event or a definite and
specific time or date.6'
9. The Prohibition of Harmful Use
With this incident and the next, Honor6 makes the point that
ownership entails disadvantages as well as advantages. One
rather obvious disadvantage is that the owner is under a duty
not to use or manage the thing owned in ways that would be
harmful to other members of the public.65
10. Liability to Execution
A second disadvantage is that creditors have a power as
against the owner (the owner has a liability) to coerce satisfac-
tion of their claims by taking from the owner the thing
owned.66
11. Residuary Character
Understanding the residuary character concept requires us to
recognize that there may be property interests in a thing that do
63. Varying degrees of transmissibility are possible, from those that would permit
the owner's interest to pass to a limited number of generations only, to one that
would permit that interest to go on indefinitely. The latter is what Honor6 has in
mind. See Honor6, supra note 49, at 120-21.
64. See id. at 121-22. That this incident and the incident of transmissibility are
two parts of the same concept of "unlimited duration" should be obvious. In contrast
to the former, however, the incident of absence of term assumes the owner's contin-
ued well-being.
65. See id. at 123. As Munzer concludes: The idea of property rights is narrower
than that of property. Property rights involve only advantageous incidents. Property
involves disadvantageous incidents as well." MUNZER, supra note 17, at 24.
66. See Honor6, supra note 49, at 123-24.
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not amount to ownership. Honor6 maintains that when all such
lesser interests terminate, a corresponding aggregate of rights,
privileges, powers, and immunities will always vest in the own-
er.
67
C. The Character of a Property Interest
With this account of the liberal concept of ownership in hand,
let us now consider exactly which incident(s) or subsets of inci-
dents can properly be regarded as a property interest, even
though that interest may amount to something less than owner-
ship.
To make this identification, I suggest that we focus on what is
the essential and fundamental similarity among the incidents of
value" in Honor6's list. If each right is examined carefully, one
discovers that the legal conceptions of power and immunity
predominate. The right to possess, and to use, and to manage,
and to the income, and to the capital, and to security would be
academic without the ability to exclude others from exercising
dominion over the thing. If X does not have available to her an
arsenal of remedies that would allow her to acquire and retain
possession against persons generally,69 how could it be said that
she has, in any realistic sense, a property interest? The value of
each right listed by Honor6 would be seriously impaired, and
possibly destroyed, if legitimate rights holders who have not
misbehaved could be deprived of their rights by others without
their consent. An interest, therefore, is logically a property inter-
est only if others can be excluded by the use or threat of legal
force.7 ° To state this in Hohfeldian terms: X can claim that she
67. See id. at 126-28. For example, "[wihen the sub-lessee's interest determines
the lessee acquires the corresponding rights; but when the lessee's right determines
the 'owner' acquires these rights. Hence the 'owner' appears to be identified as the
ultimate residuary." Id. at 128.
68. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
69. As this Article will discuss, a property interest may be present even though
an immediate and unqualified right to possession is lacking. See infra notes 72-75
and accompanying text.
70. Other writers have acknowledged that the legal power to exclude is an essen-
tial ingredient in any definition of property. For example, Morris Cohen observes
that "the essence of private property is always the right to exclude others." Cohen,
supra note 41, at 12. Felix Cohen, too, makes the point that "[p]rivate property may
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is the holder of a property interest if (1) she has a general power
to obtain or get back the thing with a correlative liability in
others to have the thing transferred against their will to X and
(2) X has a general immunity from having the item taken away
from her involuntarily with a correlative disability in others to
force X to relinquish possession and control.71
Before we continue further, an important caveat is in order. I
am not claiming that the existence of a property interest de-
pends upon the availability of remedies that can be used to
exclude all persons from the property; only that the holder must
be entitled to exclude persons generally. It is here that it might
be useful to distinguish between rights, privileges, powers, and
immunities in personam, and rights, privileges, powers, and
immunities in rem.72 The expression "in rem" traditionally has
been used to describe a similar, though separate relation, that
exists with very many persons. In contrast, in personam7 rela-
tions concern a limited number of individuals only.
or may not involve a right to use something oneself. It may or may not involve a
right to sell, but whatever else it involves, it must at least involve a right to ex-
clude others from doing something." Cohen, supra note 20, at 371. The power to ex-
clude is also an economic necessity if we wish to encourage the efficient use of re-
sources. Certainly, no one would have the incentive to improve or otherwise invest
in property if that property were at all times up for grabs. See RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10-16 (1973).
71. I should add that it is here that one must have a firm grounding in the ap-
plicable law. See supra note 26. Unless the government can be counted on to render
the appropriate assistance in excluding others, the requisite power and immunity
would not exist.
72. For an in-depth exposition of the distinction, see generally Hohfeld, Funda-
mental Legal Conceptions, supra note 21. Hohfeld prefers to use the expressions
"paucital" and "multital" instead of in personam and in rem. See id. at 712.
73. On this distinction, Hohfeld writes:
A paucital right, or claim, (right in personam) is either a unique
right residing in a person (or group of persons) and availing against a
single person (or single group of persons); or else it is one of a few fun-
damentally similar, yet separate, rights availing respectively against a
few definite persons. A multital right, or claim, (right in rem) is always
one of a large class of fundamentally similar yet separate rights, actual
and potential, residing in a single person (or single group of persons) but
availing respectively against persons constituting a very large and indefi-
nite class of people.
Id. at 718 (footnotes omitted).
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The character of the power and immunity that we should seek
to find before concluding that a property interest has been creat-
ed is one that is in rem. A simple example may serve to make
this clear. Suppose that "A, the owner of Blackacre, has given
his friends C and D, 'leave and license' to enter, A has no rights
against C and D that they shall not enter; but he has such
rights against persons in general; and they are clearly to be
classified as being 'multital' or 'in rem.' ""7 No one would doubt
in such a case that, notwithstanding the absence of a power in
personam to exclude C and D, A continues to have a property
interest in Blackacre.75
With this caveat in mind, we can proceed to a more specific
characterization of the nature of the remedies that define prop-
erty interests. In 1972, Calabresi and Melamed wrote an article
in which they discussed several techniques for protecting legal
entitlements. 6 One such technique is a "property" rule. They
maintain that an entitlement is protected by a property rule
when it cannot be transferred without the current owner's con-
sent. Consequently, anyone who wishes to acquire the entitle-
ment is compelled to purchase it at a price which is acceptable
to the owner.7 7 Another technique is a "liability" rule. With
such a rule the transfer of an entitlement may be compelled
without the current owner's consent, provided the owner is com-
74. Id. at 719 n.22.
75. It is probably also true that A's power of exclusion is subject to other inter-
ests and his immunity from having Blackacre taken away from him involuntarily is
not universal. A requirement of universality in this regard would simply not be in
accord with reality. See supra note 38. Moreover, A's property interest does not
preclude the possibility that C and D may also have a property interest in
Blackacre. Whether they do will depend, in turn, on the extent to which they are
empowered under the relevant law to exclude others. Cf International Postal Supply
Co. v. Bruce, 194 U.S. 601 (1904). According to Justice Holmes:
In the case at bar the United States is not the owner of the machines, it
is true, but it is a lessee in possession, for a term which has not expired.
It has a property, a right in rem, in the machines, which, though less ex-
tensive than absolute ownership, has the same incident of a right to use
them while it lasts.
Id. at 606 (emphasis added); see also U.C.C. § 2A-531 (1990) (Standing to Sue Third
Parties for Injury to Goods).
76. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
77. Id. at 1092.
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pensated, ex post, for its loss." The amount of the loss (damag-
es) is set by the state, typically a court.
Although Calabresi and Melamed focus on how we should
choose between a "property" rule and a "liability" rule, 9 the
point I wish to emphasize is that if an entitlement, under ap-
propriate circumstances, cannot be protected by the former rule,
the entitlement (whatever else it may be) is not a property inter-
est."0 Some examples may help illustrate the congruence be-
tween the rule chosen (the remedy) and the character of the
entitlement or interest.
Assume that X is the "owner" of timberland on which it con-
ducts a logging operation. No one would deny that when the
trees are cut down, X has a property interest in the logs. The
reason is clear. X could permanently enjoin third parties gener-
ally from interfering with her possession.8 ' Now assume that Y,
78. Id. The final type which they discuss is the "inalienability" rule. Id. at 1092-
93, 1111-15. Voting rights, for example, cannot be sold or transferred. Id. at 1111-15.
79. Essentially they maintain that a property rule promotes an efficient allocation
of resources in those situations in which the cost of negotiating a consensual trans-
fer of the entitlement would not be unduly high. If the owner's consent to the trans-
fer is required, she is guaranteed to receive a price that she perceives to be a fair
approximation of the objects value. On the other hand, if acquiring the owner's con-
sent would be prohibitively expensive, economic efficiency would be better served by
a liability rule which gives the owner what others believe the object to be worth.
See id. at 1106-10, 1125-27. For more on the economic consequences of the choice of
rule, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Note, I'd Rather Be Liable Than You: A Note on
Property Rules and Liability Rules, 6 INTIL REV. L. & ECON. 255 (1986). For a dis-
cussion of the choice in the context of philosophical theories of autonomy and con-
sent, see Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability
and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CI. L. REV. 1 (1993).
80. For a similar observation along these lines, see Jules L. Coleman & Jody
Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 1335, 1338-39 (1986) ("It
is surely odd to claim that an individual's right is protected when another individual
is permitted to force a transfer at a price set by third parties. Isn't the very idea of
a forced transfer contrary to the autonomy or liberty thought constitutive of
rights?"). How, then, should we characterize X~s interest in cases in which she is the
beneficiary of a liability rule? My suggestion is simply to emphasize that the concep-
tion of entitlements includes more than property interests. For example, where a
sales tax must be paid to the State when an item is sold, the State has an entitle-
ment; however, I doubt that anyone would maintain that the State has a property
interest in all items that are subject to that tax.
81. See, e.g., HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY §§
133-134, at 361-63 (2d ed. 1948) (discussing injunctions against trespass to land and
injunctions against nuisance). X would also have the common law privilege to defend
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a trespasser, succeeds in removing some of X's logs. The ques-
tion of whether X still has a property interest in those logs is
once more reduced to that of the extent of X's legal remedies and
the choices she makes. X can either recover damages equal to
the full value of the logs82 or the logs themselves.' Because a
remedy presumably exists which would allow X to recapture the
logs, the taking by Y, without more, would have no effect on X's
property interest. However, if X elects to obtain a judgment for
damages only, she will have chosen by her own accord to em-
power Y to take title to the logs by satisfying that judgment."
If the power is exercised, either by or for Y,M X's legal interest
will be extinguished. 6
her possession of the logs by using reasonable force. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 21, at 131-37 (5th ed. 1984).
82. The substantive tort of "conversion," as distinguished from "trespass to chat-
tels," is reserved for situations where, as here, the interference with possession is
substantial. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 81, § 15, at 88-106. If we as-
sume that the plaintiff is the owner of the chattel, the usual measure of damages
for conversion is the value of the chattel. See id. at 90.
83. "Detinue" and "replevin" were the two common law actions which were avail-
able for the recovery of personal property. Today, a statutory replevin action is the
typical vehicle for obtaining possession of property wrongfully taken. Depending upon
the jurisdiction, replevin is sometimes referred to as Claim and Delivery, Detinue,
Revendication, or Sequestration. See generally DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF REMEDIES § 5.13, at 399-403 (1973). X would also have the limited privilege
to use self-help to recapture her logs. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 81, § 22, at
137-42.
84. By satisfying the judgment, Y in effect is buying the chattel. See, e.g., Miller
v. Hyde, 37 N.E. 760 (Mass. 1894); Gunther v. Morey Larue Laundry Co., 29 A.2d
713 (N.J.), affd, 33 A.2d 893 (N.J. 1943).
85. If X has a judgment against Y, X usually will have available to her one or
more postjudgment remedies which will allow her to sell property of Y in satisfac-
tion of the judgment. In Hohfeld's terms, the judgment empowers X (Y has the cor-
relative liability) to transfer Y's legal interest in property to a third party.
86. This conclusion follows from the fact that the transfer of title to Y means that
X may no longer recover possession or exclude others; hence, she has been stripped
of her rights in rem. In a slightly different context, this same point was made by
Professor Ames in an article written in 1892:
Trespass, however, was a purely personal action; it sounded only in
damages. The wrongful taking of chattels was, therefore, a more effectual
disseisin than the ouster from land. The dispossessed owner of land, as
we have seen, could always recover possession by an action. Though
deprived of the res, he still had a right in rem. The disseisor acquired
only a defeasible estate. One whose chattel had been taken from him, on
the other hand, having no means of recovering it by action, not only lost
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Finally, assume that Y is the owner of an adjoining piece of
property and that when he takes the logs he honestly believes
them to be his. Y then uses the logs to make barrel hoops. 7
What effect will this transformation have on X's property inter-
est? In this situation we would have to look to the doctrine of
specification to see whether X has lost her possessory remedy
and is limited to the recovery of conversion damages." Specifi-
cation occurs when a new article is made out of one person's
chattel through the skill and labor of another.89 If the barrel
hoops are considered to be a new species of good, X's interest
terminates; if not, X retains the option of choosing to take pos-
session of the hoops." Although the doctrine is easily stated, its
the res, but had no right in rem. The disseisor gained by his tort both
the possession and the right of possession; in a word, the absolute prop-
erty in the chattel taken.
J.B. Ames, Disseisin of Chattels, 3 HARV. L. REV. 23, 29 (1890) (emphasis added).
87. For an actual case involving an innocent trespasser who converted lumber into
barrel hoops, see Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311 (1871).
88. Once again, if the possessory remedy has been lost, she would no longer have
rights in rem and her property interest in the now transformed lumber would cease
to exist. Instead, X would be left with a right in personam (a claim for damages)
against Y.
89. If the specificator has succeeded in creating a new species of good, the original
owner's interest terminates; if not, the owner of the original good retains title to the
end product. See RAY A. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 6.2, at 50-51
(3d ed. 1975); Earl C. Arnold, The Law of Accession of Personal Property, 22 COLUM.
L. REv. 103, 105 (1922); Roscoe Cross, Another Look at Accession, 22 MISS. L.J. 138,
138 (1951). The doctrine of specification originated in Roman Law, and its common
law evolution has been influenced by civil law notions of property rights. There is a
distinction made under the civil law, however, that has not been accepted wholesale
by common law courts. Under Roman Law, if the specificator transformed the origi-
nal good into a new item with different physical properties than the original, title to
the good vested with the specificator. If, however, merely the size or shape of the
original good were altered, the owner of the original good retained title to the end
product. See BROWN, supra, § 6.2, at 50. This distinction apparently not been rigor-
ously maintained in the common law. As Professor Brown has noted:
The [Roman] doctrine ... is artificial and unconcerned with an ethical
determination of the problem it purports to solve. It is arbitrary and
unjust to hold that he who makes wine from another's grapes acquires
title to the resulting product, while he who carves a work of art from
another's stone does not. From the standpoint of justice the law cannot
ignore the proportion in which the materials of one and the labor of
another contribute to the value of the resulting product.
Id. at 51.
90. In Wetherbee, the court held that title to the barrel hoops was with the inno-
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application is fact-specific and inherently subjective." As one
court succinctly noted, "[the authorities] have not agreed upon
any rule by which it can in all cases be ascertained whether this
transformation has or has not taken place."92 Thus, the decision
whether X has a property interest in the barrel hoops ultimately
will rest on a doctrine that is notoriously difficult to apply.
Whatever its difficulties, the key point is that the availability of
certain remedies is precisely what is at stake in these cases.
That is, the true concern of the specification doctrine is not the
location of title as an abstract or ideal concept, but whether X,
the original owner, can recapture the transformed good. If the
judicial response is yes, the interference by Y should not be
viewed as extinguishing X's property interest.
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that when the exis-
tence of X's property interest in an item is called into question,
the courts have three alternatives. They can (a) withhold all
remedies, thus allowing third parties generally to deprive X of
possession and control; (b) require third parties generally to
compensate X (pay damages) if they wish to deprive her of pos-
session and control; or (c) protect X's interest with a property
rule, thus giving X the power to exclude third parties generally.
Only the third option is consistent with the recognition of a
property interest.
cent trespasser. Wetherbee, 22 Mich. at 320. The court was influenced by the fact
that the value of the hoops was 28 times that of the original lumber. Id. at 313,
320.
91. Compare Riddle v. Driver, 12 Ala. 590, 591-92 (1847) (wood transformed into
charcoal is same species of good) and Eaton v. Langley, 47 S.W. 123, 125-26 (Ark.
1898) (timber transformed into cross ties is same species of good) and Burnis v.
Johnson, 24 Ky. (1 J.J. Marsh.) 196, 197-98 (1829) (timber transformed into boat
frame is same species of good) with Lampton's Ex'rs v. Preston's Ex'rs, 24 Ky. (1
J.J. Marsh.) 454, 467 (1829) (clay transformed into fired brick is a new species of
good) and Potter v. Mardre, 74 N.C. 36, 42 (1876) (timber transformed into canoe is
a new species of good).
Often relevant to the doctrine's applicability is the specificator's good faith. As
one court observed, a "wilful wrongdoer acquires no property in the goods of anoth-
er, either by the wrongful taking or by any change wrought in them by his labor or
skill, however great that change may be." Silsbury v. McCoon, 3 N.Y. 379, 387
(1850).
92. Eaton, 47 S.W. at 124.
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This approach to identifying property interests requires some
substantive doctrine by which the availability of remedies can be
assessed. In other words, the claimant must be able to defend
his or her choice of remedy by pointing to a particular substan-
tive rule."3 Unfortunately, this approach often raises problems
very similar to those encountered when the relevant source of
law is specification. Where the issues are simple, it may be that
a particular doctrine can be applied with a high level of confi-
dence. In other cases, its application is harder. Moreover, each
doctrine generates unique problems of its own. 4 This is no rea-
son, though, to reject a definition of property that is predicated
on the power to exclude. Courts make difficult decisions every
day and clearly have the institutional competence to determine
what, if any, remedies may be awarded in a given case. Admit-
tedly, this leads to some conceptual indeterminacy, but this has
always been true of efforts to characterize property and cannot
be avoided.95 To conclude, on this view the definition of proper-
ty will not tell us when the law ought to make available certain
remedies, but the remedies the law makes available will tell us
when a property interest exists.
III. APPLICATION TO CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF GOODS
In this Part of the Article, I survey the performance of a con-
tract for the sale of goods from the moment of its formation
through to its execution. This survey is intended to provide the
basis for understanding when a property interest may legiti-
mately be said to vest in the buyer." In so doing, the signifi-
93. See DOBBS, supra note 83, § 1.2, at 3 ("The remedy is merely the means of
carrying into effect a substantive principle or policy .... [Alnyone considering rem-
edies must have at least some notion what the substance is about.").
94. For example, consider the complexity of the doctrine of good faith purchase.
Despite its partial codification in U.C.C. § 2-403, problems of scope and application
continue to abound. For a discussion of some of these problems, see Fairfax
Leary, Jr. & Warren F. Sperling, The Outer Limits of Entrusting, 35 ARK. L. REV.
50 (1981).
95. See, e.g., Comment, The Variable Quality of a Vested Right, 34 YALE L.J. 303,
309 (1925) ("[T]he difficulty that causes such a volume of disagreement is the cha-
meleon character of the term 'property right' or 'vested right': the fact that it is not
an absolute standard, but a variant which each man, layman, legislator, and judge,
determines individually out of his own background.").
96. Recall that a fractionalization of property interests is possible. See supra notes
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cant Article 2 events that reflect the gradual shift of
entitlements from the seller to the buyer will be assessed. Be-
cause the availability of some remedy that empowers the buyer
to exclude others is an unavoidable prerequisite of a property
interest, the emphasis throughout is upon the remedial aspects
of each event.
A. Contract Formation
In order to decide whether contract formation alone is suffi-
cient to establish a property interest in the buyer,97 consider
the simple case of a buyer who, on June 1, agrees to purchase a
popular brand of television set after inspecting a demonstration
model on the seller's showroom floor. First, assume that the
seller maintains a large inventory of sets and the parties under-
stand that the seller will select one at random for shipment to
the buyer. Second, assume that the contract says nothing about
the buyer's remedies should the seller fail to deliver.
What are the property rights of the buyer on June 1? To this
question Article 2 provides a clear answer: "Goods must be both
existing and identified[5 ] before any interest in them can
pass.""9 Moreover, before identification there is not even a sale.
Section 2-106(1) defines "present sale" as "a sale which is accom-
plished by the making of the contract."' 0 Because a "sale"
takes place when title passes from the seller to the buyer,''
52-53 and accompanying text. The possibility exists, therefore, that both the seller
and the buyer will have a property interest in the goods. See infra notes 166-70 and
accompanying text.
97. By phrasing the issue in this manner and making the assumptions that fol-
low, I intend to eliminate from consideration any factor other than the existence of
a contract. An alternative phrasing of the issue would be whether contract forma-
tion, in every case, transfers a property interest to the buyer.
98. The concept of identification is discussed infra notes 107-09 and accompanying
text. Suffice it to say here that identification has not occurred because no particular
television has been singled out for shipment to the buyer.
99. U.C.C. § 2-105(2) (1990) (emphasis added). In this respect, Article 2 is consis-
tent with its statutory precursor, the Uniform Sales Act. The latter provided that
"no property passes until the goods are ascertained." UNIF. SALES ACT § 17, 1
U.LA. 309 (1950) (withdrawn 1962).
100. U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1990).
101. Id.
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and because title cannot pass before identification," 2 merely
contracting to buy will not necessarily result in a sale."0 3 Con-
sequently, at this point in the transaction it is obvious that the
buyer cannot point to a particular television from which she has
the legal power to exclude others.1 4 But it does not follow that
the absence of an interest in rem is the absence of an interest in
personam. The buyer has the right to receive a television "in ac-
cordance with the contract"0 5 and this right always can be en-
forced against the seller by an award of damages.' 6
102. See id. § 2-401(1).
103. In some instances, "title will pass at the time ... of contracting." Id. § 2-
401(3)(b). What the definition of present sale requires is the concurrence of two
events: formation of a contract and passage of title.
104. Oddly enough, some case law arguably stands for the proposition that one in
the position of our hypothetical television buyer can be a buyer in the ordinary
course of business. For a discussion of this authority, see Frisch, supra note 2, at
543-47.
Indeed, the idea that at a minimum goods must be identified to the contract
before an interest can pass has been a constant in the development of sales law.
Holdsworth noted that
[i]f, therefore, a contract of sale were made which gave the purchaser the
right to bring detinue for the thing sold, it was easy to say that he had
the property as the result of the sale. It is clear that this reasoning will
not apply to sales of chattels which are not specific, as detinue would not
lie in such a case.
3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 356-57 (3d ed. 1923). This common law
view also found expression in the Uniform Sales Act which provided for specific
performance in those cases [wlhere the seller has broken a contract to deliver spe-
cific or ascertained goods . . . ." UNIF. SALES ACT § 68, 1 U.LA. 291 (1950) (with-
drawn 1962) (emphasis added). The drafters of the Code, however, sought to remove
this barrier to specific performance. "Specific performance is no longer limited to
goods which are already specific or ascertained at the time of contracting." U.C.C. §
2-716 cmt. 2 (1990). Evidently, the reason for the change was to increase the likeli-
hood that the remedy will be available for the breach of contracts, such as long-term
supply contracts, where all of the goods cannot be identified when the contract is
made and will not be identified by the seller after its breach. Id. The change was
certainly never intended to accelerate the moment that a property interest passes to
the buyer. The goods still must first be identified by someone. See id. § 2-105(2);
supra note 99.
105. U.C.C. § 2-301 (1990) ("The obligation of the seller is to transfer and deliv-
er . . . in accordance with the contract.").
106. The buyer would also have an in personam claim against any third party who
intentionally interfered with this contractual right. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
provides:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of
a contract . . . between another and a third person by inducing or other-
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B. Identification
Let us assume the same facts and assumptions as in the pre-
vious hypothetical, except that the seller has selected and ad-
dressed a television for shipment to the buyer. In Code parlance,
a television has now been "identified" to the contract of sale."°7
No longer is it intuitively and textually obvious that the buyer is
without a property interest. Indeed, in so far as the explicit text
of Article 2 is concerned, it leaves little doubt that an interest of
sorts has been acquired. According to section 2-501(1), with
identification the buyer acquires "a special property and an in-
surable interest in goods." 108 But is this characterization of the
buyer's interest a property interest? Whatever terminology is
employed, the key point is that a true property interest cannot
be defined independently of the remedial consequences the Code
attaches to the buyer's special property. Saying that the buyer
has a special property, therefore, ultimately does no more than
pose the crucial question that must be answered: Are remedies
triggered that now give the buyer the power to compel the deliv-
ery of the television? The following discussion identifies and
explains the main Code rules that are predicated on the con-
cepts of identification and special property."9
wise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to
liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from
the failure of the third person to perform the contract.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977).
107. Identification as a separate concept appeared for the first time in the Code. It
does have, however, its statutory antecedents. See UNIF. SALES ACT § 18(1), 1 U.L.A.
8 (1950) (withdrawn 1962) (referring to "specific or ascertained" goods). Under § 2-
501, identification takes place when a particular good is in some way earmarked for
a particular buyer. The Code tells us (in a circular definition) that this happens
"when the contract is made if it is for the sale of goods already existing and identi-
fied," U.C.C. § 2-501(1)(a) (1990), or, if the sale is of future goods, "when [they] are
shipped, marked or otherwise designated by the seller as goods to which the con-
tract refers." Id. § 2-501(1)(b). The Code's definitional approach to identification as-
sumes that the parties have not agreed otherwise. They remain free to establish
their own rules as to when identification will occur. See id. § 2-501(1). Also, identifi-
cation does not require that the goods conform to the contract, id., or "be in a deliv-
erable state." See id. § 2-501(1) cmt. 4.
108. Id. § 2-501(1).
109. Section 2-501 is primarily definitional. With the exception of equating identifi-
cation with a special property and an insurable interest in the goods, the section's
basic purpose is to prescribe when identification occurs. Id. § 2-501(1) cmt. 3.
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1. An Insurable Interest
The Code specifically gives the buyer an insurable interest in
goods which are both existing and identified to the contract."'
In our hypothetical, the buyer has this insurable interest in the
television even though she does not have possession, even
though she does not have title,"' and even though she does not
bear the risk of loss."' Can we presume from this that a prop-
erty interest is the basis for the insurable interest? A brief look
to the recognized bases for finding an insurable interest should
give us our answer.
Because most buyers have an economic interest in the receipt
of the goods, a rule that only a property interest may serve as
an insurable interest would undermine the purpose of property
insurance by placing an artificial limitation on the ability of
buyers to obtain protection against a real risk of pecuniary dam-
age."' Not surprisingly, and notwithstanding the obvious logic
of a concept of insurable interest premised on a property right,
110. Although this is stated as a two-pronged test-goods must be in existence and
be identified-clearly, the controlling prong is identification. It is difficult to imagine
a situation where nonexistent goods have been identified. Of course, even identifica-
tion may not always be a prerequisite for an insurable interest. Subsection (3) to
§ 2-501 incorporates non-Code law rules about insurable interest. It provides: "Noth-
ing in this section impairs any insurable interest recognized under any other statute
or rule of law." Id. § 2-501(3). It may be that insurability outside the Code is not
always dependent upon identification. However, one commentator observed that
"[w]hile there is no authority on the question, it is doubtful whether any jurisdiction,
in the absence of statute, would recognize such an interest." John M. Stockton, An
Analysis of Insurable Interest Under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, 17
VAND. L. REV. 815, 831 (1964).
111. See U.C.C. § 2-401 (1990). When no explicit agreement encompasses the time
and place title is to pass, title passes "at the time and place at which the seller
completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods." Id. §
2-401(2).
112. Typically, the risk of loss will not pass to the buyer until delivery. See id. §
2-509 (Risk of Loss in the Absence of Breach).
113. See N.Y. CO1WN REPORT, supra note 9:
[Ihf the market price has risen after the making of the contract or if
buyer's business operations are interrupted by the non-arrival of the
goods, buyer faces loss. In some instances, destruction of the goods by
casualty may excuse the seller from responding to buyer in damages.
Even if seller is legally responsible to buyer for the loss, a cause of ac-
tion against seller is not an adequate substitute for insurance.
Id. at 462-63.
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three other types of insurable interest have developed: contract
right, legal liability, and factual expectancy.114 It does not nec-
essarily follow, therefore, that the insurable interest given by
identification always will be based on a property interest. It
could be based just as easily on either a concept of contract
right"5 or the factual expectancy of economic disadvantage."6
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the drafters' purpose in
including a section on insurable interest was to free property in-
surance from any notion that "all the definitions of an 'insurable
interest' import an interest in the property which can be en-
forced at law or in equity.""7
In sum, the Code gives the buyer of the television an insur-
able interest for no reason other than she faces a loss if, for any
reason, the seller fails to deliver. It should now be clear that an
insurable interest cannot identify instances in which a property
interest is present. However difficult an inquiry into remedies
might be, it remains the only inquiry that matters.
2. The Right of the Buyer to Sue for Injury to Goods
Under section 2-722, the buyer may sue a third party
tortfeasor for injury to goods following their identification to the
contract."8 The seller, too, will have a cause of action after
114. See generally Bertram Harnett & John V. Thornton, Insurable Interest in Prop-
erty: A Socio-Economic Reevaluation of a Legal Concept, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 1162,
1165-75 (1948) (discussing these four types of insurable interests); Stockton, supra
note 110.
115. One who makes a contract certainly has an economic interest in goods that
have been identified to that contract and ordinarily should be able to protect that
interest with insurance. See supra note 113.
116. See Stockton, supra note 110, at 817 ("This ... concept rests on the very
general theory that one should have an insurable interest in any property which if
lost, damaged, or destroyed, might result in economic disadvantage to him.").
117. Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co. v. New Holland Turnpike Rd. Co., 15 A. 563, 565 (Pa.
1888).
118. Section 2-722 reads in part:
Where a third party so deals with goods which have been identified
to a contract for sale as to cause actionable injury to a party to that
contract (a) a right of action against the third party is in either party to
the contract for sale who has title to or a security interest or a special
property or an insurable interest in the goods ....
U.C.C. § 2-722 (1990). Because a buyer has an insurable interest and a special prop-
erty in goods upon identification, he will be able to maintain an action as the real
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identification if he has any one of the following: (1) title,' (2)
a security interest, 20 (3) an insurable interest, 2' or (4) (in
the event of destruction or conversion of the goods) the risk of
loss.' Thus, if a thief were to abscond with the television that
has been readied for shipment to the buyer and identified to the
contract, both the seller and the buyer would have the right to
sue as the real parties in interest. However, to assume that we
can deduce who has a property interest in the television from
this statutory right to sue would be a mistake.
Prior to the Code, the right of the buyer or the seller to sue a
third person ordinarily was based on a perceived property inter-
est in the goods. 2 ' For example, at least one court had con-
strued the New York real party in interest statute as requiring
the plaintiff to have some title, legal or equitable, to the
goods." In the comment accompanying New York's section 2-
722, the drafters explain that their purpose is "[tlo adopt and
extend somewhat the principle of the statutes which provide for
suit by the real party in interest."" Thus, section 2-722 will
broaden the class of proper plaintiffs in some state jurisdictions
party in interest.
119. For the point at which title will usually pass to the buyer, see infra note 111.
120. The seller may have an Article 9 security interest. Another form of security
interest is an Article 2 security interest. Section 2-401(1) states that "[a]ny retention
or reservation by the seller of the title (property) in goods shipped or delivered to
the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest." U.C.C. § 2-
401(1) (1990); see also id. § 2-505 (addressing a seller's shipment of goods under
reservation). This may not be the only instance in which the seller is given an Arti-
cle 2 security interest. See generally id. § 9-113 (referring to a security interest
arising solely under Article 2); Thomas H. Jackson & Ellen A. Peters, Quest for
Uncertainty: A Proposal for Flexible Resolution of Inherent Conflicts Between Article 2
and Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 87 YALE L.J. 907 (1978) (discussing
potential Article 2 security interests other than the common law seller's lien para-
digm).
121. See U.C.C. § 2-501(2) (1990) ("The seller retains an insurable interest in goods
so long as title to or any security interest in the goods remains in him ... .
122. Id. § 2-722(a).
123. See N.Y. COlm'N REPORT, supra note 9, at 587 ("Present law lends itself to a
simple premise: a cause of action for damage to goods depends on the invasion of a
'property' interest."). There was, however, authority supporting a bailee's right to
sue. See, e.g., Colvin v. Fargo, 94 N.Y.S. 377 (App. Div. 1905).
124. See Scholick v. Fifth Ave. Coach Co., 68 N.Y.S.2d 208 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct.
1947).
125. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-722 cmt. (Consol. 1981) (emphasis added).
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to sometimes include buyers and sellers who lack property inter-
ests. Moreover, the section seems to indicate that the plaintiff
may recover even if he is not the actual party injured. If there is
injury to "a party," then either party-buyer or seller-who
qualifies under paragraph (a) has standing to sue.'
The drafters probably had in mind two separate and indepen-
dent justifications for how the section was diafted. First, they
likely desired to relieve courts from the practical difficulties of
identifying a single person as the "owner" when both buyer and
seller may share an interest in the property.'27 Second, section
2-722 reflects an effort to accommodate the economic interests of
both sellers and buyers without regard to the location of title. As
was discussed above, pecuniary damage may result even though
a property interest is lacking. 8 If a buyer can insure against
the risk of loss in such a situation, it would be anomalous to
deny him the right to sue the person who is responsible for the
loss.
In short, section 2-722 cannot tell us whether the buyer has a
property interest because this section is not about remedies.'29
126. See N.Y. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 9, at 589 (suggesting that "it may be
possible to conclude that the party who sues must show 'actionable injury', but this
reading does not flow naturally from the language of the Code"). When one party
recovers for injury to the other party's interest, "his suit or settlement is, subject to
his own interest, as a fiduciary for the other party to the contract." U.C.C. § 2-
722(b) (1990). From this it follows that § 2-722 precludes separate suits and sepa-
rate recoveries by buyer and seller. See Mitsui & Co. (USA) v. Hudson Tank Termi-
nals Corp., 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1220 (2d Cir. 1986).
127. See N.Y. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 9, at 718 ("The section would remove
the difficulties which have often been encountered heretofore in determining who, as
between owners of divided interests in property, had a right of action when the
property was converted, damaged, or destroyed by a third person.").
128. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text. In our example, even if the
buyer does not have a property interest in the televisions, she does have an econom-
ic interest in the seller's performance which ought to be protected. Thus, at a mini-
mum she should be permitted to recover damages under U.C.C. § 2-713 (the differ-
ence between the market price and the contract price) or U.C.C. § 2-712 (the differ-
ence between the "cover" price and the contract price) from the tortfeasor.
129. At least one case demonstrates that there is no assurance that courts will
understand the proper function of the section. In Carey Aviation, Inc. v. Giles World
Marketing, Inc., 46 B.R. 458 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985), the court erroneously concluded
that § 2-722 was the source of the buyer's right to recover possession from the
seller's secured party. The court failed to appreciate that once the buyer's priority
under § 9-307(1) was established (the court was wrong on this count too, but this is
1724
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Rather, section 2-722 amounts to no more than a statutory ad-
dendum to existing rules about who is the real party in interest.
The real issue is not whether the buyer may sue for a loss which
may or may not be hers, but whether there are remedies avail-
able which make it possible for her to obtain and keep posses-
sion of the goods.
3. The Buyer's Right to Goods on Seller's Insolvency
Any extended discussion of Article 2 invariably will touch on
the subject of the seller's insolvency.3 ' This is the case because
the most scrupulous seller will find it more difficult to perform
when insolvent and the buyer likely will find that damages are
not an adequate remedy. This raises an important policy issue:
what special rights, if any, should be afforded the buyer when
the seller's insolvency intervenes? Historically, the seller's in-
solvency has not been a sufficient condition for granting specific
performance, especially in those cases where the buyer has pre-
paid in whole or in part.'' In this situation, section 2-502 pro-
vides that
another story, see generally Frisch, supra note 2) the remedy of replevin-or its state
law equivalent-would lie without regard to § 2-722.
130. Under the Code, "[a] person is 'insolvent' who either has ceased to pay his
debts in the ordinary course of business or cannot pay his debts as they become due
or is insolvent within the meaning of the federal bankruptcy law." U.C.C. § 1-
201(23) (1990).
131. The argument against granting specific performance to a prepaying buyer is
that such a grant would prefer the buyer over other creditors of the seller who also
have extended credit. See, e.g., Jamison Coal & Coke Co. v. Goltra, 143 F.2d 889
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 769 (1944); CORBIN, supra note 11, § 1156. On the
other hand, where there has been no prepayment there would be no preference and
allowing the remedy would not seem to violate any particular principle. While some
courts have considered the seller's financial condition to be a relevant factor, see,
e.g., Livesley v. Johnston, 76 P. 946 (Or. 1904), most have held that it is not a
sufficient reason to give specific performance to the buyer. See H.C. Horack, Insol-
vency and Specific Performance, 31 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1918); Henry L. McClintlock,
Adequacy of Ineffective Remedy at Law, 16 MINN. L. REV. 233 (1932); Note, Specific
Performance and Insolvency--A Reappraisal, 41'ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 577 (1967). But
see Proyectos Electronicos, S.A. v. Alper, 37 B.R. 931 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding spe-
cific performance appropriate because the seller was in bankruptcy). For a discussion
of the buyer's rights when the seller goes bankrupt, see infra notes 202-29 and
accompanying text.
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a buyer who has paid a part or all of the price of goods in
which he has a special property under the provisions of the
immediately preceding section may on making and keeping
good a tender of any unpaid portion of their price recover
them from the seller if the seller becomes insolvent within
ten days after receipt of the first installment on their
132price.
New here is the explicit recognition that the prepaying buyer
deserves some special protection even if granting that protection
means that she is being preferred over the seller's other credi-
tors. And what flows from this recognition? Upon reading
the section, one cannot help but notice that the legal power it
grants is nothing short of an illusion destined ever to elude the
grasp of most buyers who may wish to use it.
One reason the power afforded by section 2-502 is illusory is
that to make use of the section, the buyer must have a "special
property" in the goods under section 2-501, which is the same as
saying that the goods must be identified to the contract. Al-
though this requirement may not present an insurmountable
problem for some buyers, it may make the section unavailable to
a large portion of those buyers who contract for specially manu-
factured goods.' Furthermore, there is the near impossible
task of having to prove that the seller was solvent when it re-
ceived the first installment and that it became insolvent within
ten days thereafter. 135 Beyond these restrictions, the buyer
may have to contend with the Bankruptcy Code's limitations on
the exercise of state-created powers to recover property. 36
132. U.C.C. § 2-502(1) (1990).
133. The seller too is afforded limited preferential treatment when the buyer turns
out to be insolvent. See id. § 2-702.
134. It has been suggested that identification of specially manufactured goods to
the contract does not occur prior to their completion. See 3A R. DUESENBERG & L.
KING, BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS UNDER
THE U.C.C. § 9.05[3], at 9-50, 9-51 (1980). But see Little v. Grizzly Mfg., 636 P.2d
839 (Mont. 1981) (holding that identification occurs at the time of the first step in
production).
135. For a case that held that § 2-502 was inapplicable when the seller was insol-
vent at the time of the initial payment, see First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v.
Academic Archives, Inc., 179 S.E.2d 850 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971).
136. See infra notes 210-29 and accompanying text.
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To repeat, section 2-502 in its present incarnation does no
more than pay lip service to the protective needs of the prepay-
ing or financing buyer.'37 We can say with substantial confi-
dence, for example, that the section would be of no assistance
whatsoever to our television buyer-regardless of whether there
was or was not a prepayment-should the seller default. We can
say with equal confidence that if the section were available, the
buyer would have a property interest in the television. This
property interest would arise from the legal power to force the
seller to deliver. 8'
4. Buyer's Right to Specific Performance or Replevin
Given that the same Code section (section 2-716) defines the
circumstances in which both specific performance and replevin
are available, I shall combine my discussion of these two reme-
dies. A unified discussion of specific performance and replevin is
particularly appropriate in light of the fact that the use of both
may sometimes depend on a common factual predicate.'39
Few premises are recited so frequently and so reflexively as
"specific performance will not be granted unless it is shown that
the legal remedy (damages) is inadequate." No one would doubt
a careful study of pre-Code specific performance cases would
yield the uniqueness of the goods as the major explanatory prin-
ciple.' If the seller does not deliver the goods, the buyer most
137. This reality led to the Article 2 Study Group's recommendation to repeal § 2-
502. PERMANENT EDrORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB
STUDY GROUP UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2, PRELIMINARY REPORT 132
(Rec. A2.5(2)) (1990) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY REPORT]. The Drafting Committee,
however, has taken the opposite approach. Rather than scrap the section because of
its restrictive limitations, the Committee has decided to strengthen the section by
scrapping some of the limitations. See U.C.C. § 2-502 (Discussion Draft Dec. 21,
1993).
138. Moreover, so long as the seller's possession is not viewed as fraudulent under
non-Code law, this power can be exercised notwithstanding the objections of the
seller's unsecured creditors. See U.C.C. § 2-402(1) (1990) ("[Rlights of unsecured
creditors of the seller with respect to goods which have been identified to a contract
for sale are subject to the buyer's rights to recover the goods under this Article
(Sections 2-502 and 2-716).").
139. I wish to emphasize at the outset that despite our present concern with the
remedial consequences of identification, only the availability of replevin is dependent
on this event. See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
140. See generally D.A. Norris, Annotation, Specific Performance, or Injunction
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often will be able to obtain similar goods elsewhere. As a result,
the buyer's expectation interest is fully vindicated by a damages
award. Thus, the remedy at law was adequate. The legal com-
munity has been so well indoctrinated to search solely for
uniqueness that even the revolutionary language of the Uniform
Sales Act fell on deaf ears.'
4
'
The Code, not surprisingly, reserves specific performance for
those cases "where the goods are unique or in other proper cir-
cumstances."' Ironically, however, this seemingly traditional
statement belies the drafters' true intent, which they inexplica-
bly decided to express in the comments. The drafters, apparently
hoping to foster a liberalization of the remedy,' offer in the
comments an expanded definition of uniqueness that takes into
account "the total situation which characterizes the contract." In
addition, "relief may also be granted 'in other proper
circumstances' and inability to cover is strong evidence of 'other
proper circumstances.'""'
No doubt much more may be said, but what has been said
leads to the inescapable conclusion that despite the ambiguity of
the tests chosen by the drafters, the remedy of specific perfor-
mance was never intended to be available absent the buyer's
actual or practical inability to tap an alternative source of
supply. 4' On the facts of our hypothetical, application of sec-
Against Breach, of Contract for Sale of Tangible Personal Property, 152 A.L.R. 4
(1944).
141. The Uniform Sales Act reads:
Where the seller has broken a contract to deliver specific or ascertained
goods, a court having the powers of a court of equity may, if it thinks
fit, on the application of the buyer by its judgment or decree direct that
the contract shall be performed specifically ....
UNIF. SALEs ACT § 68, IA U.L.A. 291 (1950) (withdrawn 1962). Although this provi-
sion invited courts to reform traditional specific performance doctrine, the invitation
was refused. "[Diecisions have construed this language against a background of equi-
ty practice to require a showing that the remedy at law be inadequate." N.Y.
COMMN REPORT, supra note 9, at 575.
142. U.C.C. § 2-716(1) (1990).
143. See id. § 2-716 cmt. 1 ("[Tlhis Article seeks to further a more liberal attitude
than some courts have shown in connection with the specific performance of con-
tracts of sale.").
144. Id. § 2-716 cmt. 2.
145. For a valuable analysis of § 2-716 and the buyer's right of specific perfor-
mance, see generally Harold Greenberg, Specific Performance Under Section 2-716 of
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tion 2-716 rather easily yields the conclusion that should the
seller refuse to deliver the television, the court most surely
would deny specific performance.
Replevin, the second remedy in section 2-716, also was never
intended by the drafters to be available to average buyers. If the
goods have been identified to the contract, the right to replevy
them is conferred "if after reasonable effort [the buyer] is unable
to effect cover for such goods or the circumstances reasonably
indicate that such effort will be unavailing or if the goods have
been shipped under reservation and satisfaction of the security
interest in them has been made or tendered."46 One core ob-
stacle to using replevin emanates from the requirement that the
goods must have been identified to the contract. Professor
Nordstrom correctly points out that if the contract is for future
goods, the seller who has decided to breach is unlikely to make
the requisite identification.47 The buyer faces further difficulty
in attempting to prove an inability to cover by the purchase of
substitute goods. It is particularly hard to know whether the
circumstances reasonably indicated that a reasonable effort to
obtain cover would have been unavailing.'
the Uniform Commercial Code: "A More Liberal Attitude" in the "Grand Style", 17
NEW ENG. L. REv. 321 (1982).
146. U.C.C. § 2-716(3) (1990). This provision is new. Formerly, the only require-
ment for replevin was that title to the goods had passed to the buyer:
Where the property in the goods has passed to the buyer and the
seller wrongfully neglects or refuses to deliver the goods, the buyer may
maintain any action allowed by law to the owner of goods of similar kind
when wrongfully converted or withheld.
UNIF. SALES ACT § 66, IA U.L.A. 240 (1950) (withdrawn 1962).
147. ROBERT J. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 159, at 481
(1970). Moreover, whatever evidence of identification that does exist usually will be
in the seller's possession. Id. at 482. Perhaps this explains the relative dearth of
reported replevin cases when compared to those that involve specific performance. As
noted by the Article 2 Study Group, specific performance, "which is not limited to
identified goods, appears to be a more complete goods oriented remedy." PRELIMI-
NARY REPORT, supra note 137, at 233 (Rec. A2.7(14)(B)). For this reason the Study
Group recommended that § 2-716(3) be deleted. Id. However, the Drafting Committee
has decided otherwise. The reason for the Committee's decision was that replevin,
when it is an option, may be a more expeditious remedy than specific performance.
148. This test for replevin may be the same as that for specific performance if
inability to cover is the result of uniqueness or is taken to establish "other proper
circumstances." See U.C.C. § 2-716 (1990).
149. In resolving this issue, the court in Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe &
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No matter how you slice it, the television hypothetical pres-
ents an easy case. The result should be the same whether the
buyer requests specific performance or replevin. Given the vast
and easily accessible market for televisions, I doubt that even
the most liberally minded judge could find in the text of section
2-716 a reason why the buyer should be given a proprietory
power over the television.
C. Tender of Delivery and Beyond
To this point in the performance of the television sales con-
tract, the buyer has yet to acquire a property interest.5 ' To be
sure, the buyer has a special property interest and an insurable
interest in the television. But, as I have noted, these interests do
not rise to the level of a property interest. If the seller now repu-
diates or later fails to make delivery when due, the buyer, if she
still wishes to watch television, will have to shop elsewhere for
her set. Keeping this in mind, we can continue with the remain-
der of the story.
It is now time for the seller to complete its performance by
making a proper tender of delivery. 5' Assume that the agree-
ment provides for the shipment of the television to the buyer by
means of an independent carrier.'52 Accordingly, the seller
Moyer Garage, Inc., 487 A.2d 953 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), used as its guide cases that
discuss mitigation as a prerequisite to the recovery of consequential damages under
§ 2-715(2)(a). This led the court to conclude that in addition to the type of goods
involved, "[i]t may also be pertinent . . . to consider the expense of replacement and
the financial capabilities of the buyer." Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co., 487 A.2d at
960.
150. This statement also assumes the inapplicability of § 2-613. Although ostensibly
the purpose of this section is to state one ground for the excuse of the seller's non-
performance (Casualty to Identified Goods), the section can be read as giving the
buyer a possessory remedy should the buyer still want the goods. See U.C.C. § 2-
613(b) (1990) ("[If the loss is partial or the goods have so deteriorated as no longer
to conform to the contract the buyer may nevertheless demand inspection and at his
option . . . accept the goods .. . .") (emphasis added).
151. See id. § 2-301 ('The obligation of the seller is to transfer and deliver ... .
Because it would add nothing to the discussion in the text, I purposely have ignored
the buyer's payment obligation and the effect that it may have on the seller's duty
to deliver. See, e.g., id. § 2-511(1) ("Unless otherwise agreed tender of payment is a
condition to the seller's duty to tender and complete any delivery.").
152. Section 2-503(1) provides that "Ithe manner, time and place for tender are
determined by the agreement and this Article ... .' Id. § 2-503(1). I have assumed
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places the television in the possession of the trucker and makes
a proper contract of carriage.15 When this is done, I believe
the buyer for the first time enjoys a property interest.
Preliminarily, I note that title to the television and the risk of
loss passed from the seller to the buyer when the seller deliv-
ered the goods to the carrier for shipment to the buyer.15
Thus, we see and sense that the buyer is rapidly accumulating
many of the standard incidents of full ownership. 55 As impor-
tant as such incidents may be, they do not necessarily imply a
property interest. However, when we look further, we see that
the buyer finally has the power to obtain possession of the tele-
vision. To find this power we must alter our perspective and
focus on the possessory remedies that are available to the seller
if it should wish to reclaim the television. The limitations of
these remedies are the best evidence of the power of possession
and control that now resides with the buyer.
Under section 2-505, for example, the seller may control deliv-
ery of the television by several methods of shipment."8 The ob-
vious inference to draw from this section is that if one of these
methods is not utilized and no other section of the Code is appli-
cable, the seller must lose and the buyer must gain the right of
that the parties have agreed to shipment by carrier for two reasons. First, it would
be unreasonable to assume that the agreement would permit the seller to tender by
holding the goods at its place of business. Id. § 2-308(a). Second, shipment by means
of the seller's own truck would have no effect on the buyer's rights. Until actual
delivery, the situation would be the same as it was pre-shipment. See, e.g., id. § 2-
509(3) (passing risk of loss to the buyer upon receipt of the television).
153. When the contract either requires or authorizes the seller to ship the goods to
the buyer there is a strong presumption that the contract is a "shipment contract."
Id. § 2-503 cmt. 5; see Electric Regulator Corp. v. Sterling Extruder Corp., 280 F.
Supp. 550, 558 (D. Conn. 1968) (recognizing the U.C.C.'s "presumption in favor of
'shipment' contracts"). In a shipment contract the seller tenders delivery at the point
of shipment and must comply with the provisions of § 2-504. U.C.C. § 2-503(2)
(1990).
154. Section 2-401(2)(a) provides that if the contract is a shipment contract, "title
passes to the buyer at the time and place of shipment . . . ." U.C.C. § 2-401(2)(a)
(1990). Similarly, "the risk of loss passes to the buyer when the goods are duly
delivered to the carrier . . . ." Id. § 2-509(1)(a).
155. See supra notes 54-67 and accompanying text.
156. Section 2-310(b) provides that "unless otherwise agreed . . . if the seller is
authorized to send the goods he may ship them under reservation" pursuant to § 2-
505. U.C.C. § 2-310(b) (1990).
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possession the moment that the television is handed over to the
carrier. If the seller procures a negotiable bill of lading, the
seller will have a security interest in the television until the bill
of lading is surrendered to the buyer.'57 The seller also retains
a security interest when a nonnegotiable bill of lading names the
seller as consignee. 5 ' By reserving a security interest in the
television, the seller continues to have a property interest.'59
But property interests can be divided up. 60 Importantly, call-
ing the seller's interest a property interest does not preclude a
property interest from also vesting in the buyer. Section 2-716
provides that replevin may be invoked by the buyer "if the goods
have been shipped under reservation and satisfaction of the
security interest in them has been made or tendered."6' This
gives the buyer ultimate control over the disposition of the tele-
vision.
The reservation of a security interest aside, there is one in-
stance in which the seller can still wrest possession and control
of the television away from the buyer before delivery.'62 Sec-
tion 2-705 empowers the seller to stop delivery of any shipment
"when [the seller] discovers the buyer to be insolvent." 6' In
such a case, even if the television is not shipped under reserva-
tion the seller is given a remedy that sounds very much like a
157. Id. § 2-505(1)(a). It makes no difference who is made the order party. Id.
158. Id. § 2-505(1)(b). This subsection further provides that "a non-negotiable bill of
lading naming the buyer as consignee reserves no security interest even though the
seller retains possession of the bill of lading." Id.
159. It is now well established that a security interest is a state-created property
right. See, e.g., Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
160. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. "The security interest reserved
to the seller under subsection (1) is restricted to securing payment or performance
by the buyer and the seller is strictly limited in his disposition and control of the
goods as against the buyer and third parties." U.C.C. § 2-505 cmt. 1 (1990).
161. Id. § 2-716(3). "If a negotiable document of title is outstanding, the buyer's
right of replevin relates of course to the document not directly to the goods." Id.
§ 2-716(3) cmt. 5.
162. After delivery, the seller's possessory remedies are limited to § 2-702(2) (credit
seller's explicit right of reclamation) or § 2-507(2) (cash seller's implicit right of rec-
lamation).
163. U.C.C. § 2-705(1) (1990). The right of stoppage is broader for large shipments:
e.g., carload, truckload or planeload. Id. In that case, the seller may stop delivery
"when the buyer repudiates or fails to make a payment due before delivery or if for
any other reason the seller has a right to withhold or reclaim the goods." Id.
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security interest.'6 Obviously, this remedy would be unneces-
sary if the buyer did not otherwise have a proprietary power. If
the buyer is not insolvent, when the seller places the television
in the possession of the carrier, the power to take possession and
exercise control passes to the buyer."5
Finally, let us briefly consider the allocation of property inter-
ests between the buyer and the seller after delivery. I suspect
that only the buyer will have a property interest,'66 and that
interest is likely to continue until it is transferred to another
with her consent. Suppose, however, that after receipt of the
television, the buyer exercises her rights to reject'67 or to re-
voke acceptance. 6 s Upon the exercise of such rights, the pro-
cess by which the buyer gained a property interest will be
thrown into reverse. The seller will regain title'69 and posses-
sion will follow provided the seller returns to the buyer what the
buyer paid for the television. 7 ° In short, there may be an ebb
and flow of property interests as the buyer/seller relationship
matures and develops.
164. In fact, the right of stoppage may be an Article 2 security interest. See id. §
9-113 cmt. 1 (stating that "the seller has rights of resale and stoppage . . . which
are similar to the rights of a secured party").
165. For example, "if the carrier, upon instructions from the consignor, returns the
goods to him, the consignee may recover the goods from the consignor or his insol-
vent estate." Id. § 7-303 cmt. 2.
166. The seller will also have a property interest if it can reclaim the television
under § 2-702(3) or § 2-507(2) or if it has an Article 9 security interest.
167. See U.C.C. § 2-601 (1990) (Buyer's Rights on Improper Delivery).
168. See id. § 2-608 (Revocation of Acceptance in Whole or in Part).
169. See id. § 2-401(4) ("A rejection or other refusal by the buyer to receive or
retain the goods, whether or not justified, or a justified revocation of acceptance
revests title to the goods in the seller.").
170. Section 2-711(3) provides as follows:
On rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of acceptance a buyer
has a security interest in goods in his possession or control for any pay-
ments made on their price and any expenses reasonably incurred in their
inspection, receipt, transportation, care and custody and may hold such
goods and resell them in like manner as an aggrieved seller (Section 2-
706).
Id. § 2-711(3). Although this security interest arises by operation of law under Ar-
ticle 2, in some respects it also will be subject to the provisions of Article 9. See id.
§ 9-113 (Security Interests Arising Under Article on Sales or Under Article of Leas-
es).
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IV. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
To this point, much of what I have said is abstract and theo-
retical. I have sought to sketch a positivist approach to property
rights that necessarily fixes its focus on legislative and court-
made remedies, but I have not yet confronted the hard question
of just what difference all of this makes in the real world. In
this Section, I take up the recent decision of the Article 2 Draft-
ing Committee to permit a buyer of goods to create a right to the
remedy of specific performance by private agreement. As will
become apparent, the concept of property rights that I have
outlined entails very practical implications for these specific
performance clauses.' 7'
An Article 9 security interest affords a perspective. Article 9
accepts the policy imperative that a secured party should be re-
quired to give notice of its otherwise secret interest by filing or
taking possession of the collateral. 7 2 Thus far no one has sug-
gested that buyers who use a specific performance clause should
be subjected to a similar Article 9 type filing requirement. To be
sure, the remedy of specific performance is not a lien.'73 Still,
171. Each of these implications is multifaceted and cannot be fully explored here. I
shall confine my discussion to those aspects that bear on the problem of ostensible
ownership created by the use of a specific performance clause.
172. See U.C.C. §§ 9-302(1), 9-305 (1990). Generally, if the secured party fails to
take either step (i.e., "perfect" the security interest), it will lose out to most third
parties who subsequently acquire an interest in the collateral. Id. § 9-301. The often-
stated rationale for Article 9's perfection and priority scheme is the doctrine of os-
tensible ownership or, as it is sometimes called, reputed ownership. This doctrine,
with its genesis in the celebrated Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber
1601), is premised on the simple idea that third parties rely on a person's posses-
sion of property as a signal of ownership. Because courts have sought to maintain
the accuracy of this signal, they have viewed as fraudulent any separation of owner-
ship and possession, with the result that the ostensible or apparent owner of the
property has been treated as the true and exclusive owner. For a comprehensive
discussion of ostensible ownership and the issues it raises in today's commercial
environment, see Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Mystery and Myth of "Ostensible Own-
ership" and Article 9 Filing: A Critique of Proposals to Extend Filing Requirements
to Leases, 39 ALA. L. REV. 683 (1988).
173. An Article 9 security interest is a consensual lien on "personal property or
fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation." U.C.C. § 1-201(37)
(1990). Its most important attribute is the limited power it gives the secured party
after default to "sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral .... "
Id. § 9-504(1). Once the indebtedness has been satisfied, the secured party must
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the interest created by a specific performance clause strongly
resembles a security interest. What we have in both cases is a
consensually created property interest that gives its holder the
power to take possession of designated property.74 Conse-
quently, those who urge the enforceability of specific perfor-
mance clauses must explain how the so-called ostensible own-
ership problem created by the buyer's secret interest can be
handled successfully or why it is not really a problem.'75
A. A New Regime for Specific Performance
My discussion of the simple television sale provided a single
important insight. It showed that only rarely will the buyer of
goods have available to her a possessory remedy prior to the
time that the goods are shipped or delivered; that is, no property
interest passes until the seller has tendered delivery. In this
setting, it matters a great deal whether courts are willing to
honor a clause that gives the buyer the right to specifically en-
force the contract. If the Drafting Committee has its way and a
provision is added to the Code that declares that courts may
enforce a clause in a contract providing for specific performance,
the frequency of use and effectiveness of such clauses can be
expected to change dramatically.
Considering the lack of litigation that specific performance
clauses have engendered over the years (counting both Code and
turn over any surplus proceeds to the debtor. Id. § 9-504(2). Unlike a security inter-
est, the property interest created by a specific performance clause would not require
the buyer to dispose of the property and if it is disposed of by the buyer, the seller
would have no interest in the proceeds.
174. If specific performance derives not from a clause in the contract but from the
nature of the goods or transaction, a constructive trust analogy might be more ap-
propriate. The constructive trust is an equitable remedy that gives title to the plain-
tiff "of something that in equity and good conscience [does] not belong to the defen-
dant." DOBBS, supra note 83, § 4.3, at 241.
175. In this Article, I do not purport to judge either the merits of the ostensible
ownership rationale for mandating the public disclosure of interests or the choice
made by the Drafting Committee with regard to the enforceability of specific perfor-
mance clauses. I assume that, once the implications of that decision are properly
understood, the ostensible ownership debate that until recently centered around the
drafters' decision not to require public filing for leases of goods under Article 2A,
will begin again. For a good overview of that debate, see generally Mooney, supra
note 172.
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non-Code cases), I have to assume that they rarely find their
way into contracts.'76 One can speculate that such a clause,
despite being potentially advantageous to many parties,' is
rarely used because courts by and large do not feel that the use
of the clause dispenses with the need to establish the traditional
prerequisites for specific relief. 78 The explanation most often
given for this restrictive view is historical: "Because the avail-
ability of equitable relief was historically viewed as a matter of
jurisdiction, the parties cannot vary by agreement the require-
ment of inadequacy of damages, although a court may take ap-
propriate notice of facts recited in their contract."7 The latter
176. I have found only two U.C.C. cases where a clause providing for specific per-
formance was used. In both instances the clause operated in favor of the seller and
was found to be a proper exercise of the parties' right to provide for their own rem-
edies under § 2-719. See Martin v. Sheffer, 403 S.E.2d 555 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991);
Frank LeRoux, Inc. v. Burns, 480 P.2d 213 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971). The Drafting
Committee's proposal may be seen to be a rejection of this result. See supra note 19.
For a collection of the leading non-Code cases that address the enforceability of
clauses providing for specific performance or injunctive relief, see Ian R. Macneil,
Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 495, 521 n.88 (1962).
177. Professor Yorio lists the three advantages most often noted by commentators:
First the clause protects any subjective interest that the promisee has in
performance by the particular promisor. Placing a monetary value on that
interest and assessing damages for its loss are likely to be difficult. Sec-
ond, a specific performance clause enables a promisor who is a newcomer
in the trade to offer the added inducement of an explicit contractual
guarantee of performance to secure a contract that might otherwise be
unobtainable. Third, a specific performance clause reduces litigation costs
whenever assessing damages would be complex, time-consuming, and
expensive.
EDWARD YORIO, CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND INJUNCTIONS §
19.2.2, at 442-43 (1989).
178. See, e.g., Snell v. Mitchell, 65 Me. 48, 50 (1876) ("Neither party to a contract
can insist, as a matter of right, upon a decree for its specific performance."); Man-
chester Dairy Sys., Inc. v. Hayward, 132 A. 12, 15 (1926) ("[Aluthority, if any here,
is to be found not in the express stipulations for equitable relief, but in the general
principles limiting equitable jurisdiction.").
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359 cmt. a (1979). Professor Dobbs,
however, questions the legitimacy of this view. See DOBBS, supra note 83, § 12.5, at
825. Others who question the wisdom of the present-day approach include Anthony
T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CmI. L. REV. 351, 376 (1978) (stating that
contracting parties are better equipped than courts to dictate the appropriateness of
specific performance); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE
L.J. 271, 277 (1979) ("The very fact that a promise requests specific performance
thus implies that damages are an inadequate remedy."); Thomas S. Ulen, The Effi-
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part of this statement suggests that although a specific perfor-
mance clause cannot guarantee the remedy, it may make a dif-
ference in a close case.
180
In sum, the contemplated revision to Article 2 would work a
revolution in theory. It would change the way courts respond to
specific performance clauses. Once the core obstacle to their
enforcement has ,been lifted, we can expect a corresponding
revolution in the practice of those who draft and negotiate con-
tracts.
B. Nonbankruptcy Implications
1. When the Seller Sells the Goods to a Third Party
One issue that is certain to arise is the relative rights of the
first buyer ('First Buyer") and a second buyer ("Second Buyer")
who purchases goods from the seller, only to find later that the
goods were subject to a specific performance clause in favor of
First Buyer. Put another way, the issue is whether First Buyer
could sue Second Buyer for conversion and recover the value of
the goods from him, or in replevin for a return of the goods
themselves. Under real estate law, the rule in such cases is that
Second Buyer is protected if she can be described as a good faith
purchaser for value. 8' Although one is tempted to apply set-
tled real estate law principles to resolve this new issue of per-
sonal property law, analogizing to the former is proper only if we
find that doing so is consistent with the text and policies of the
Code. ' 2
ciency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83
MICH. L. REv. 341, 350-56 (1984) (viewing specific performance clauses as an effi-
cient means of allocating risks and protecting subjective values). But see Edward
Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of Contract, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1365, 1368-69 (1982) (arguing that contract remedies should reflect more than just
the interests of the immediate parties).
180. See Kronman, supra note 179, at 371 ("A contractual provision accompanied by
a lengthy description of those aspects of the transaction that make specific perfor-
mance desirable is likely to carry more weight than a provision unadorned by sup-
porting explanation.").
181. See, e.g., Saperstein v. Mechanics' & Farmers' Savings Bank, 126 N.E. 708
(N.Y. 1920); Maurer v. Albany Sand & Supply Co., 337 N.Y.S.2d 44 (App. Div.
1972); Flackhamer v. Himes, 53 A. 46 (R.I. 1902).
182. This is exactly what was not done in Joneil Fifth Ave. Ltd. v. Ebeling &
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In Article 2, the general conveyancing principle appears in
section 2-403(1): "A purchaser of goods acquires all title which
his transferor had or had power to transfer... .""' Thus, in
the absence of a statutory or common law exception, Article 2
follows the derivation principle of nemo dat and provides that
Second Buyer takes the goods subject to the property interest
created by First Buyer's specific performance clause. Many
would find this result shocking. No prospective buyer would be
able to determine, with relative accuracy, the risks he faces from
competing claimants. I do not mean to make light of this prob-
lem, but this is already a circumstance that buyers are forced to
confront."M In any event, I believe that the relative rights of
the two buyers will turn exclusively on whether the court will
consider non-Code law. 185
Reuss Co., 458 F. Supp. 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). There, in a sale of goods case the
court applied, without explanation, the real estate rule that a good faith purchaser
does not take subject to specific performance remedy. Id. at 1200-01.
183. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1990). The principle expressed in this section has two as-
pects. One is the "derivation" principle of nemo dat. See supra note 5 for the com-
plete latin phrase. Nemo dat dictates that the transferee takes its interest subject to
all third-party claims and interests that were enforceable against the transferor. This
principle is not confined to Article 2. See, e.g., id. §§ 3-305(a), 3-306, 7-504, 8-301, 9-
318. The second aspect to § 2-403(1) is commonly referred to as the "shelter" princi-
ple. When the transferor has priority over third-party claims, the transferee will
enjoy that same priority. This principle too is reflected in other Code sections. See,
e.g., id. §§ 3-203(a), 7-504(1). For insightful discussions of the conveyancing princi-
ples that underlie the Code, see generally PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE: COMMENTARY 6 (Final Draft Mar. 10, 1990), reprinted in [Findex/PEB Com-
mentaries] U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan); John F. Dolan, The U.C.C. Framework:
Conveyancing Principles and Property Interests, 59 B.U. L. REV. 811 (1979); Steven
L. Harris, The Interaction of Article 6 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A
Study in Conveyancing, Priorities, and Code Interpretation, 39 VAND. L. REV. 179
(1986).
184. The number and variety of potential hidden interests about which a buyer has
to worry are too numerous to detail. Suffice it to say that they include security
interests, see, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d) (1990) (a purchase money security interest in
consumer goods is perfected without filing or possession); the ownership interest of
one from whom the goods were stolen, see, e.g., Morgan v. Hodges, 50 N.W. 876
(Mich. 1891); and the ownership interest of a lessor, see U.C.C. § 2A-305 (1990).
185. The question whether the court will consider non-Code law is not easy to
predict. This point was made recently in an essay by Professor Harris criticizing
courts for their failure to appreciate the role that non-Code law may play in what is
ostensibly a Code-covered case. See Steven L. Harris, Using Fundamental Principles
of Commercial Law to Decide UCC Cases, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 637 (1993).
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Unless a court were willing to characterize the seller's interest
as "voidable title," 86 there is no statutory exception in the
Code to the general rule in section 2-403(1).187 Therefore, it
seems appropriate that we accept the invitation of section 1-103
and concentrate our focus on non-Code law.'8 Because real es-
tate law already affords a theoretical construct for dealing with
the property rights of the two buyers, a court might wish to
apply it to the conflict under discussion.
The first step in applying the real estate construct would be to
extend the doctrine of equitable conversion to contracts for the
sale of goods. Because the doctrine "is merely and exclusively
the consequence of the application by a Court of Equity of the
doctrine of specific performance,"'89 a goods contract that in-
cludes a specific performance clause would satisfy the core crite-
rion for its application. As Professor Dobbs explains, "The whole
doctrine can be expressed by saying that, in equity, the purchas-
er is owner of the land, and the vendor is owner of the purchase
price. The vendor's interest, then, can be thought of as personal
property (the purchase price) rather than real property (the
land)."9 ' In other words, the buyer is viewed as the equitable
186. The second sentence of § 2-403(1) provides that "[a] person with voidable title
has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value." U.C.C. § 2-
403(1) (1990). Although the term "voidable title" is undefined, the examples given by
the drafters suggest that it is a concept reserved for buyers. See id. § 2-403(1)(a)-(d).
187. The only other statutory exception to nemo dat that might conceivably be rele-
vant is the entrustment rule of § 2-403(2), which reads as follows: "Any entrusting
of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives him
power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of busi-
ness." Id. § 2-403(2). But has there been an entrusting? Unless First Buyer can be
said to have acquiesced in the seller's retention of possession, id § 2-403(3), the an-
swer is no.
188. Section 1-103 explicitly mandates that courts supplement Code provisions with
general principles of law and equity unless they have been displaced by particular
Code provisions. Id. § 1-103. Similarly, a comment to § 2-403 reads:
[T]he policy of this Act expressly providing for the application of supple-
mentary general principles of law to sales transactions wherever appro-
priate joins with the present section to continue unimpaired all rights ac-
quired under the law of agency or of apparent agency or ownership or
other estoppel, whether based on statutory provisions or on case law
principles.
Id. § 2-403 cmt. 1.
189. Haynes v. Haynes, 62 Eng. Rep. 442, 452 (1861).
190. DOBBS, supra note 83, § 2.3, at 41.
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owner of the property. To be sure, this is merely a fiction, but
equitable conversion reasoning has practical utility. For one
thing, such reasoning would enable a court to apply the long-
standing rule that in a dispute between a legal titleholder and
an equitable titleholder, the former will prevail if he purchased
the legal title for value and without notice of the preexisting
equitable claim. 9' As a result, Second Buyer (the legal title-
holder) would defeat First Buyer (the equitable titleholder).
2. The Rights of Unsecured Creditors of the Seller
Article 2 contains a provision that explicitly subordinates the
rights of a seller's unsecured creditors (presumably judicial lien
creditors) against goods in which the buyer has a specific pro-
prietary interest. Section 2-402(1) provides: 'Except as provided
in subsections (2) and (3), rights of unsecured creditors of the
seller with respect to goods which have been identified to a con-
tract for sale are subject to the buyer's rights to recover the
goods under this Article (Sections 2-502 and 2-716). "192 Be-
cause prior identification is not a prerequisite for specific perfor-
191. See id. § 4.7, at 281-83. Alternatively, the court could skip the equitable con-
version analysis and analogize to those cases that applied the rule to similar dis-
putes involving constructive trusts and equitable liens. See id. at 283.
Another consequence of equitable conversion reasoning is that it may permit
First Buyer to recover from the seller the profit that the seller earned on the sale
to Second Buyer. See, e.g., Coppola Enters. v. Alfone, 531 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1988). Be-
cause sellers often will breach when the market is rising or a better deal comes
along, the significance of measuring First Buyer's recovery by the amount of the
seller's gain rather than by the amount of the seller's loss cannot be overstated.
Because such a measure would eliminate whatever incentive the seller would other-
wise have to breach, First Buyer's interest in the contract would now be protected
by something closely akin to a property rule. See Kronman, supra note 179, at 380-
82.
192. U.C.C. § 2-402(1) (1990). Subsection (2) deals with the effect of the seller's
possession of sold goods. Its basic design is to leave intact, in each jurisdiction, the
Twyne rule, see supra note 172, in whatever form it exists at present. The subsec-
tion does not incorporate law external to the Code in one situation: creditors have
no right to void as fraudulent the "retention of possession in good faith and current
course of trade by a merchant-seller for a commercially reasonable time after a sale
or identification." U.C.C. § 2-402(2) (1990). For the purpose of this Article, I assume
that the seller's possession of the goods will not be deemed to be fraudulent under
applicable state law. Finally, subsection (3) makes the point that the section was not
meant to impair the rights of secured creditors under Article 9. See id. § 2-402(3)(a).
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mance, 193 one unanswered question arises: Does this section
apply if a court compels the seller to make an identification after
the goods have been levied upon? Whatever the answer, the
subsection gives fair warning to unsecured creditors that reli-
ance on the seller's possession is, at best, risky business.
3. The Rights of Secured Creditors of the Seller
Consider first the case of a secured party whose security inter-
est predates the buyer's contract with a specific performance
clause. Because I remain convinced that buyer status is achieved
the moment the buyer acquires a pre-delivery possessory right
against the seller," I would approach this priority dispute in
the same manner as I would any other involving a buyer. That
is, I would decide in favor of the secured party unless the buyer
is a buyer in the ordinary course of business or the disposition
was authorized by the secured party.
195
However, it strikes me that by permitting buyers to contract
for pre-delivery buyer status we may have found one way for the
prepaying or financing buyer'96 to protect himself without hav-
ing to incur the expense of obtaining a subordination agreement
193. See supra note 104.
194. See generally Frisch, supra note 2.
195. See U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1990) (a buyer in ordinary course of business generally
takes free of a security interest); id. § 9-306(2) (a security interest does not continue
if the disposition was authorized). Prior to actual delivery it would not matter
whether the secured party's security interest was perfected. See id. § 9-301(1)(c)
(buyer not in ordinary course of business must receive delivery to take priority over
an unperfected security interest).
196. For present purposes, I use these terms interchangeably to include any buyer
who prepays. Others may not be so inclined.
[A] financing buyer might be defined narrowly to include only those who
advance funds to the seller that in fact enable the seller to manufacture
or process the goods to be sold. Or, eligibility for the special priority
might be defined expansively to include any buyer who prepays. The
Committee tends to favor the former, narrower approach.
PERMIANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY
GROUP UNIFORf COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 REPORT 196 (1992) (footnote omitted)
[hereinafter PEB ARTICLE 9 REPORT]. For more on the plight of the prepaying buyer,
see generally Irving A. Gordon, The Prepaying Buyer: Second. Class Citizenship Un-
der Uniform Commercial Code Article 2, 63 NW. U. L. REV. 565 (1968); Thomas H.
Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, A Plea for the Financing Buyer, 85 YALE L.J. 1
(1975).
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from the seller's earlier-in-time inventory financier or seek ques-
tionable purchase money priority under section 9-312(3).'
Moreover, buyers would receive even more protection than they
would if the Code gave them a special enabling lien with priori-
ty. The Article 9 Study Committee put the matter in context:
A senior security interest alone would not, of course, enable a
financing buyer to obtain specific performance of the sale
contract. Rather, it would entitle the financing buyer to en-
force its damage claim for non-delivery against the collateral.
The Drafting Committee may wish to consider a more radical
approach, such as giving the financing buyer an automat-
ically perfected, statutory lien that would be senior to any
earlier-in-time inventory security interest and would (to the
extent practicable) entitle the financing buyer to enforce
against the collateral a right of specific performance. If the
Article 2 Drafting Committee adopts the recommendation of
the PEB Article 2 Study Group that the remedy of specific
performance be more readily available when the parties so
agree, the differences between the Committee's recommenda-
tions and the statutory lien approach might be negligible.'
Next, consider the different question of who gets the goods
when the claimants are a first-in-time buyer with a specific
performance clause and a second-in-time secured party. Applica-
tion of nemo dat protects the buyer's interest. To elaborate, the
secured party's rights are limited to those of its debtor, the sell-
er. As a consequence, the secured party takes subject to the
property interest arising under the buyer-seller contract-the
power of the buyer to take possession by way of specific perfor-
mance.'99 To be sure, not all courts can be expected to appreci-
ate the relevance of nemo dat. Professor Harris spoke powerfully
to this point when he said that "[t]he opinions represent a lack
197. The impediments to achieving purchase money priority are detailed fully in
Jackson & Kronnian, supra note 196. Probably the most significant requirement is
the need to show that the money advanced was in fact used to acquire the goods.
See U.C.C. § 9-107(b) (1990).
198. PEB ARTICLE 9 REPORT, supra note 196, at 195-96 n.4.
199. Presumably, the seller still would have sufficient rights in the collateral to
support a valid security interest. See, e.g., Kinetics Technology Int'l Corp. v. Fourth
Nat'l Bank, 705 F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that any interest other than
naked possession gives the debtor rights in the collateral).
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of understanding of one of the fundamental concepts of commer-
cial law and, for that matter, all property law. The failure prop-
erly to utilize nemo dat evidences a failure to comprehend the
concept's role in commercial law jurisprudence."0 0 Notwith-
standing this undoubtedly correct characterization of some cas-
es, there have, in fact, been many courts that have reached the
right result.2 ' In more practical terms, the buyer's secret in-
terest would involve a certain amount of risk for uninformed
secured parties.
C. Bankruptcy Implications
Appreciation of the interesting and problematic fate of specific
performance clauses in bankruptcy begins with an understand-
ing of some elementary principles governing modem bankruptcy
law. 2 One of these is equality of distribution among creditors.
This principle historically has limited the availability of specific
performance against the trustee.0 3 One can look at specific
performance as essentially a remedy that requires the seller's
other creditors to pay the buyer's claim in full. Think about it
this way: If specific performance is denied, the buyer's claim will
be paid in "bankruptcy dollars" and the full value of the goods
200. Harris, supra note 185, at 645.
201. See, e.g., Northwestern Bank v. First Virginia Bank, 585 F. Supp. 425, 428
(W.D. Va. 1984) ([I]n the absence of special circumstances a security interest atta-
ches only to the extent of the debtor's interest."); First Natl Bank & Trust Co. v.
Smithloff, 167 S.E.2d 190, 197 (Ga. App. Ct. 1969) (same); see also State Bank of
Young America v. Vidmar Iron Works, Inc., 292 N.W.2d 244, 250 (Minn. 1980)
("[T]he secured party only gets rights in the goods to the extent of the debtor's
rights in them.").
202. In this Part, I do not purport to present an in-depth analysis of the relevant
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and many of the complex and controversial issues
that they raise. The reader who wishes more than the truncated account I can give
in the limited space available should see Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts
Revisited: A Reply to Professor Westbrook, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1991) [hereinafter
Andrew, Executory Contracts Revisited]; Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy: Understanding "Rejection," 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845 (1988) [hereinafter
Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy]; Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts
in Bankruptcy (pts. 1 & 2), 57 MINN. L. REV. 439 (1973), 58 MINN. L. REv. 479
(1974); Westbrook, supra note 18. Nonetheless, I believe that the analysis presented
here is sufficient to support my "conjecture" that the enforceability of specific perfor-
mance clauses will affect profoundly the buyer's position in the seller's bankruptcy.
203. See Westbrook, supra note 18, at 255-57.
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will be available for distribution to creditors generally, as part of
the bankruptcy estate. In other words, relieving the estate from
the duty of specifically complying with the contract increases the
value of the seller's assets.
204
However, this principle of equality is limited, insofar as it
does not attempt to prohibit a distribution of assets according to
preexisting property interests.2 ' For example, in the case of a
secured creditor in bankruptcy, if the security interest has been
properly perfected and is not otherwise subject to avoidance, the
creditor is entitled to the collateral or to be paid the amount of
the allowed secured claim before other creditors."' As Profes-
sor Jay Westbrook explains, "This 'property' principle is central
to bankruptcy law because it is by far the most important excep-
tion to the principle of equality of distribution."207 The question
is then solely one of determining whether the creditor possesses
a property interest in a specific asset, and more particularly,
whether that interest can survive application of the bankruptcy
avoiding powers. °s
In deciding whether an interest is property for bankruptcy
purposes, the Supreme Court frequently has shown great defer-
ence to nonbankruptcy law. In two cases, the Court has empha-
sized that
[i]n the absence of a controlling federal rule, we generally
assume that Congress has "left the determination of property
rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate to state law," since
such [piroperty interests are created and defined by state
204. See id.
205. See id. at 257-63.
206. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 506, 725, 1129(b)(2), 1325(a)(5) (1988).
207. Westbrook, supra note 18, at 257. Professor Andrew explained the situation
this way:
The principle behind the "no-specific-performance" argument is that allow-
ing specific performance would prefer one claimant over others similarly
situated. But bankruptcy law recognizes that not all claimants are simi-
larly situated; those with rights to property, good as against competing
claimants under state law, do not lose those rights. Thus, there is no
elevation to priority. the non-debtor party started off differently situated
as compared to other claimants, and the analysis simply takes account of
and preserves that difference, consonant with the rest of bankruptcy law.
Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, supra note 202, at 926.
208. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544-549 (1988).
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law."... Moreover, we have specifically recognized that
"[tihe justifications for application of state law are not limited
to ownership interests ....... 0'
Accordingly, if the state-law remedy of specific performance
would be available outside of bankruptcy, it would seem to fol-
low that the property interest it creates appropriately may be
exercised in bankruptcy. However, even if specific performance
were regarded as a form of property, some property interests
still would be invalid and unenforceable because there are inde-
pendent limitations on the validity or enforceability of property
interests in various circumstances. It is to these limitations that
we now turn. In so doing, it is helpful to distinguish between
those cases where the buyer has prepaid for the goods and those
cases where he has not.
1. Where the Buyer Has Prepaid
Where the buyer has prepaid for the goods and all that re-
mains is the seller's performance, it seems clear enough that the
trustee ordinarily will be powerless to defeat the buyer's right to
specific performance. 1' The avoiding power most likely to cre-
ate difficulties for the buyer is the "strong-arm" power under
section 544(a).21' Section 544(a) gives the trustee the rights of
a hypothetical lien creditor. Because a lien creditor that acquires
its lien after the buyer enters into a contract with a specific
209. Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2106, 2110 (1993) (quoting
Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979)).
210. Despite my bold assertion in the text, there is apparently ground for differ-
ence of opinion. See Westbrook, supra note 18, at 273 n.201 ("In the rare instance of
a specific performance right in personal property, as under U.C.C. § 2-716
(1987), . . . specific-performane ... would not likely survive avoiding power attack.
11 U.S.C. § 544 (1988) . . . ."). However, if the subject matter of the contract were
real property, Professor Westbrook undoubtedly would be correct. See 11 U.S.C. §
544(a)(3) (1988) (providing that the trustee may avoid any transfer that is voidable
as to a bona fide purchaser of real property).
211. I am assuming that the seller's retention of possession is not fraudulent under
state law, see supra note 192, and that the contract price is roughly equivalent to
the value of the goods. If either assumption turns out to be incorrect, the buyer's
property interest is subject to a fraudulent conveyance challenge in bankruptcy. See
11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548 (1988).
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performance clause takes subject to that remedy,2" the trustee
is not able, by virtue of enjoying the powers of a lien creditor, to
avoid the buyer's property interest. In most instances this will
work out to give the buyer an advantage over other unsecured
creditors who have extended pre-petition credit to the seller and
whose claims have an equally strong moral basis.
In the situation in which the buyer prepays and the seller
later supplies goods before the seller's bankruptcy, but during
the preference period,213 when the bankruptcy ensues, the buy-
er faces the prospect of having to return the goods received dur-
ing the preference period or to disgorge their value, while the
trustee gets to keep the full amount of the payments made. The
theory is that the prepayment was the antecedent debt on ac-
count of which the later transfer was made. Such a harsh result
might be avoided if the sales contract contains a specific perfor-
mance clause. If the specific performance clause would have
been unavoidable in bankruptcy,214 then the buyer is no better
212. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
213. This hypothetical is adapted, with some revisions, from Westbrook, supra note
18, at 273-74. See also Vern Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in
Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REV. 713, 746 & nn.180-85 (1985). Section 547(b) of Title
11 reads as follows:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may
avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor be-
fore such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the peti-
tion; or
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the
filing of the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an
insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor
would receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent
provided by the provisions of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
214. Much will depend, I think, on when the goods were identified to the contract.
Although the remedy of specific performance does not depend on identification, see
supra note 104, the property interest that it generates probably does so depend. It
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off as a result of the pre-petition transfer. If the seller had not
delivered the goods, the buyer would have been entitled to spe-
cific performance of the contract, and therefore could have got-
ten the goods anyway. Thus, one of the elements of a preference
(the creditor must be better off because of the transfer)2 15
would not be satisfied.
2. Where the Buyer Has Not Prepaid
Our consideration of the implications of specific performance
clauses in bankruptcy has proceeded without mention of the
most troublesome feature of the Bankruptcy Code's treatment of
pre-petition contracts,216 the law of executory contracts. When
a contract is executory, section 365 gives the trustee or debtor-
in-possession the choice (subject to court approval and to excep-
tions not relevant here) of "assuming" or "rejecting" a pre-bank-
ruptcy contract.2 7 If the contract is assumed, the debtor's obli-
gations thereunder become obligations of the estate. Should the
estate later breach, the creditor would have an administrative
expense priority claim.21 Conversely, the rejection of an ex-
ecutory contract "constitutes a breach of such contract...
(1)... immediately before the date of the filing of the peti-
tion .... 219
is difficult to imagine how one could have an interest in goods that are either non-
existent or not particularized. Therefore, if identification postdates payment, the
antecedent debt element of a preference would be satisfied.
215. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (1988).
216. 11 U.S.C. § 365 governs the treatment of "unexpired leases" and "executory
contracts." Professor Westbrook observes that there is no area of bankruptcy where
"the law [has] become more psychedelic than in the one titled 'executory contracts."
Westbrook, supra note 17, at 228. Professor Andrew sums it up by saying that in
the law of executory contracts "lurks a hopelessly convoluted and contradictory ju-
risprudence." Andrew, Executory Contracts Revisited, supra note 202, at 2.
217. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988).
218. One of the points on which Professors Andrew and Westbrook disagree relates
to assumption. According to Andrew, the contract is excluded from the estate until
assumption. See Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, supra note 202, at 856-
66. This "exclusionary" approach is rejected by Professor Westbrook, who argues that
the pre-bankruptcy contract becomes property of the estate under § 541 whether it
is assumed or not. See Westbrook, supra note 18, at 323-32.
219. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (1988); see also id. § 502(g) ("A claim arising from the
rejection, under section 365 ... shall be determined, and shall be allowed ... the
same as if such claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the petition.").
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Because only executory contracts can be assumed or rejected,
one should not be surprised to find that "executoriness" is the
most enigmatic concept of section 365. In cases of contracts of
modest complexity, lawyers and supposedly disinterested judges
often could argue almost too easily for sharply conflicting, yet
credible, notions of when a contract is executory.22 ° The Bank-
ruptcy Code does not define the term "executory contract."
Courts generally have relied on the definition formulated by
Professor Countryman. As he defined it, an executory contract is
"a contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and
the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the
failure of either to complete performance would constitute a
material breach excusing the performance of the other."22' It is
likely, therefore, that where, as here, the buyer is still obligated
to pay the purchase price and the seller still has to deliver the
goods, the contract remains executory.2
If the contract is executory what are the consequences that
flow from rejection? Because the traditional view of rejection
holds that it somehow destroys the contract, a number of courts
have held that specific performance is no longer a remedial op-
220. The court in In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 138 B.R. 687 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992) commented on this dilemma:
After grappling with the issues presented by the parties, we believe that
we could, using existing "executoriness" precedent, plausibly justify any
number of results, from affording either party the complete relief it
seeks, to deciding the case as we actually do. While "executoriness" anal-
ysis can provide a reason for any result we might reach, we find it use-
less as a tool for reaching a reasoned result.
Id. at 696.
221. Countryman pt. 1, supra note 202, at 460. Courts that have adopted this test
include In re Terrell, 892 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1989); Sharon Steel Corp. v. National
Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 872 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1989); In re Streets, 882 F.2d 233 (7th
Cir. 1989); Draper v. Draper, 790 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1986); Gloria Mfg. Corp. v. In-
ternational Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 734 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1984).
222. See, e.g., In re Alexander, 670 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that the con-
tract was executory where the buyer of real property had not yet paid the purchase
price and the seller had not yet conveyed title). A different conclusion might be
called for if, prior to the seller's bankruptcy, the buyer actually had obtained a judg-
ment for specific performance. See, e.g., In re Pribonic, 70 B.R. 596 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1987) (once a judgment for specific performance is entered, the contract is no longer
executory); In re Roxse Homes, Inc., 74 B.R. 810 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (same); In
re Kendell Grove Joint Venture, 46 B.R. 531 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (same), aft'd,
59 B.R. 407 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
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tion.2" Rather, the creditor's recovery is limited to monetary
damages for the breach.' However, people have begun to
think anew about what it means to reject an executory con-
tract." One prominent and unanimous end of this rethinking
is a realization that rejection "does not invalidate, rejudicate,
repeal, or avoid"226 the contract. As a result, more and more
courts are reaching the conclusion that section 365 is not an
avoiding power that can be used to destroy a right in or to prop-
erty created by the contract."' Adopting this new approach,
the bankruptcy court in In re Walnut Associates declared that "if
state law does authorize specific performance under the rejected
executory contract, it means that the debtor should be able to
enforce the contract against the Debtor, irrespective of his rejec-
tion of it."2 2
8
Thus, if specific performance clauses are enforceable under
state law, the current trend promises to increase significantly
their importance in bankruptcy. Whether one perceives the con-
tract as executory or whether one views the contract as execut-
ed, the question is one of the impact of the trustee's avoidance
powers.229
223. See, e.g., Leasing Serv. Corp. v. First Tenn. Bank Nafl Ass'n, 826 F.2d 434
(6th Cir. 1987); Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d
1043 (4th Cir. 1985); In re Waldron, 36 B.R. 633 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984); In re Ra-
man Crest Fruit, Inc., 35 B.R. 939 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
224. Some courts have embraced the view that if under the circumstances state law
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V. CONCLUSION
Despite the importance of the issue, the relationship between
remedies and property interests has never received the attention
that scholars have lavished on the concept of property in other
contexts. As a result, we seem to have never gained the proper
perspective on the issue, leading to serious confusion in the
courts 3° and the hasty decision of the Article 2 Drafting Com-
mittee to make specific performance clauses enforceable as a
means of assuring performance by the seller.
While arguing that central to the idea of property rights is the
availability of remedies that permit a person to exercise domin-
ion over the specific asset, I have also attempted to show some
of the ramifications of the Drafting Committee's decision. My
position is not, surely, that the decision was wrong. Rather, my
message is that the Committee made its policy choice in a vacu-
um without considering the consequences that are likely to fol-
low.
The ultimate point is fairly simple. If specific performance
clauses are recognized, another type of secret interest will have
been created. But the drafters have always shown a willingness
to tolerate misleading appearances in the "right" situations." 1
It is, therefore, no solution to the problem of specific perfor-
mance clauses to say simply that they should not be enforced
because they create secret interests, which may cause some trou-
blesome problems. The inquiry is whether this is another proper
situation for tolerating these problems.
230. See, e.g., Frisch, supra note 2, at 540-52.
231. See supra note 184.
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